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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, experimental interest in the process of group 
formation was generated by the suggestion that people desire 
to affiliate in order to obtain information about various 
aspects of their shared experience. Initially, the work of 
Festinger (1954) focused on people's wish to determine the 
adequacy or correctness of their opinions and/or abilities by 
directly comparing them with the verbalized statements of 
their peers. His reflections were organized as a systematic 
body of statements known as the theory of Social Comparison. 
Further consideration by Schacter (1959) led to the thought 
that people might, in addition to comparing opinions and 
abilities, also wish to compare ambiguous aspects of their 
emotional experience. He reasoned that ambiguous aspects 
like the quality and intensity of an enotional reaction could 
lead to increased affiliation in order to make comparison 
with others. Experimental manipulation of the intensity of 
fear arousal revealed a positive relationship with affilia-
tion, i.e. the greater the fear, the greater the desire for 
affiliation. The present research proposes to examine some 
further tmplications of this relationship between enotion 
arousal and affiliation. 
As derived by Schacter (1959) from Festinger's (1954) 
original conception, Social Comparison theory states that the 
human organism has a drive to evaluate his emotions. In the 
absence of objective knowledge of how others have reacted to 
an emotion arousing situation, people will wish to affiliate 
with others exposed to a similar situation in which emotion 
is aroused in order to see how their emotional state compares 
with that of others. This was experimentally supported. 
Further extension of Social Comparison theory as it pertains 
to emotions would imply that the tendency to affiliate for 
social comparison purposes decreases as the difference between 
one's own emotion and that of others increases. These dif· 
ferences might be with respect to intensity, quality and/or 
other parameters of emotional reaction. This extension is 
predicaced on the Social Comparison hypothesis that a person 
is unable to make a subjectively precise evaluation of his 
own reactions by comparing h~self with persons reacting 
very differently from h~self. 
To date, no systematic research has been undertaken to 
document this latter hypothesis with respect to the arousal 
of emotion. The present study intends to bridge this gap by 
observing the strength of desire for affiliation when people 
believe themselves to be reacting quite differently in 
emotional intensity from their fellows under identical 
stimulus conditions. Consistent with previous studies, fear 
is the emotion that has been selected for exper~ental in• 
duction. Particular emphasis will be directed to the 
affiliation desire when a person believes he is more or less 
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afraid than his fellows under identical threat situations. 
We shall consider next the details of the Social Compari-
son theory as they bear upon the present question and the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
A. The Theory of Social Comparison Processes 
In 1953, Festinger published his "Theory of Social 
Comparison Processes." It consisted of a series of systema-
tic statements about group formation and behavior under a 
variety of conditions concerning abilities and opinions. 
This theory was especially concerned with the influence of 
the need to evaluate opinions and abilities on affiliation 
behavior. Schacter (1959) and others (Gerard and Rabbie, 1961) 
drew on this theory holding that a number of Festinger's for-
mulations and pre4ictions were applicable to the condition of 
emotion arousal. Following, in close paraphrase, are excerpts 
from Festinger's hypotheses and derivations which appear 
relevant to the studies reviewed here. The word emotion has 
been substituted where the original read "opinions and 
abilities." 
Hypothesis ! - There exists in the human organism a drive to 
evaluate his enotions. 
HyPothesis !! - To the extent that objective non-social means 
are not available, people evaluate their emotions by com-
parison with the emotions of others. 
Corollary ~ - When an objective non-social basis for the 
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evaluation of one's emotion is readily available, a 
person will not evaluate his emotions by comparison with 
others. 
Hypothesis !!! - The tendency to compare oneself with some 
other specific person decreases as the difference between 
his emotion and one's own increases. A person does not 
tend to evaluate his emotions by comparison with others 
who are too divergent from himself. 
Derivation Q from .!t g, and !ill. - A person will be less 
attracted to situations where others are very divergent 
from him than to situations where others are close to 
him as regards emotions. 
Derivation D from I, II, and III - The existence of a dis-----~--~ ----- - -- --- ---
crepancy in a group with respect to emotional reactions 
will lead to action on the part of members of that group 
to reduce the discrepancy. 
Hypothesis !Y - There is a unidirectional drive upwards in 
the case of abilities. With respect to abilities, 
different performances have intrinsically different 
values. In Western culture there is a value set on 
doing better and better. 
Derivation ! ~ .!t--· g, ~ !!! - Any factors which increase 
the strength of the drive to evaluate some particular 
emotion will increase the pressure towards uniformity of 
expression concerning that emotion. In discussing the 
Lnplications of this theory, Festinger (1954) states the 
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following: 
The drive for self evaluation has ~plica­
tion not only for the behavior of persons 
in groups but also for the processes of 
formation of groups and changing membership 
of groups. To the extent that self evalua-
tion can only be accomplished by means of 
comparison with other persons, the drive 
for self evaluation is a force acting on 
persons to belong to groups and to associ-
ate with others •••• How strong the 
drives and satisfactions stemming from 
these sources are compared to the other 
needs which people satisfy in groups is 
impossible to say, but it seems clear that 
drive for self evaluation is an important 
factor contributing to make the human being 
gregarious. People then tend to move into 
groups which in their own judgement hold 
opinions which agree with their own and 
whose reactions are near their own (p. 135). 
B. Fear Arousal and Affiliation 
As conceived by Schacter (1959) and others (Sarnoff and 
Ztmbardo, 1961), emotion is an internal state or stimulus 
with motivational or drive properties. Schacter's initial 
study predicted that as anotion increases, so does the desire 
for affiliation. Utilizing female college students as 
subjects (Ss), high and low degrees of fear of electric shock 
were created in an experimental setting described to the Ss 
as a psychophysiological study of the effects of electric 
shock. High fear was induced by threat of very intense and 
painful electric shocks, while low fear was brought about by 
threat of weak and painless shocks. A fear intensity scale 
rated by the S confirmed the successful manipulation of fear 
intensity in the two groups. 
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Following the fear induction, the s. was told of a ten-
minute delay in the experiment and asked if he would care to 
wait alone or with other Ss participating in the experiment. 
This choice was offered on the pretext that the experimenter 
(E) wanted everyone to be as comfortable as possible under 
the eireumat~ces, and it had occurred to the E that some Ss 
might prefer to wait with others. After indicating his pre-
ference, the S was asked to rate the strength of his choice 
on a five-point seale ranging from ''I very much prefer being 
alone" to u1 very much prefer being with others." The 
request for strength of preference data was rationalized to 
the Ss on the basis that there might be insufficient vacant 
rooms for those wanting to be alone, and consequently E 
wanted to know how strongly each felt about his choice in 
order that E could make the most satisfactory arrangements 
for all. Following this, the S was informed of the true 
purpose of the experiment, and his cooperation enlisted in 
maintaining silence concerning the various deceptions. A 
significantly greater preference for affiliation was noted 
in the high fear group compared with the low fear group. 
Using the same general methodology described, Schacter 
(1959) repeated the high fear induction on a new group of 
girls in an effort to dete~ne if the desire to be with 
others was general or directional. Did S want to be with 
just anyone, or only others frightened l~e himself? To 
half of this high fear group he offered the opportunity to 
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be alone or wait with other girls participating in the experi-
ment. To the remainder he offered the choice of waiting alone 
or waiting with a group of girls who did not share the 
threatening experimental experience. He observed that a 
greater affiliative preference was indicated by Ss given the 
choice of being with others having undergone the same threat, 
as compared with those where this was not the case. 
After confirming that fearful Ss wished to affiliate 
only with other fearful Ss, Schacter (1959) composed a list 
of five plausible reasons to account for this affiliation 
tendency in the face of fear arousal: 
1. A collective discussion of means of avoiding the 
anticipated unpleasantness, i.e., escape. 
2. Attaining cognitive clarity regarding the nature 
of the impending danger. 
3. Indirect fear reduction, since people could serve 
as effective distraction from the ~pending threat. 
4. Direct fear reduction through mutual reassurance. 
5. Self evaluation of his emotional state through 
social comparison. 
It may be observed that this last reason is drawn 
directly from Social Comparison theory. While admitting that 
this list is hardly exhaustive, Schacter (1959) presented 
these reasons as the five most plausible bases for the 
explanation of his findings. 
He quickly ruled out the indirect fear reduction 
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hypothesis, based on the results of the "direction" experi-
ment. He reasoned that if distraction was a primary motive 
increasing affiliation, then greater affiliation should have 
been observed in the group offered the opportunity to be 
with girls not involved in the experiment, since these girls 
would have served as more efficient distractors than the 
frightened girls. This was not the case. 
To pare the list further, Schacter (1959) observed that 
verbal communication was necessary to plan a means of 
avoiding the shocks, or to attain cognitive clarity. Dis-
cussion was felt to be less salient for the two remaining 
reasons on the list. A stmple pat on the back could be 
reassuring, while just observing the nonverbal reaction of 
others offered an opportunity for evaluation through social 
comparison. 
With these ~plications of restricted communication in 
miBd, Schacter (1959) repeated the experiment originally 
described, inducing high and low fear states and obtaining 
strength of preference for affiliation. However, in this 
experiment some Ss were told that they would not be allowed 
to speak to one another if they elected to affiliate, while 
the rest were restricted only to the extent that they could 
not discuss the experiment or the threatened electric shock. 
The original high and low fear groups had had no restrictions 
placed on their communications. 
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From a comparison of these different groups, Schacter (1959) 
tentatively concluded that intense fear is positively related 
to affiliation under conditions of unrestricted verbal com-
munication, restricted verbal communication, and no verbal 
communication with other fearful Ss. In this way he el~i­
nated the escape and cognitive clarity hypotheses from his 
list of reasons, since both of these require some discussion 
of the experimental proceedings. From the original list of 
five plausible reasons, there remained only direct fear 
reduction and evaluation through social comparison to explain 
the positive fear-affiliation relationship. 
In a further analysis of his data, Schacter (1959) also 
found that the propensity to affiliate under conditions of 
intense fear arousal was positively related to the ordinal 
position of the S with respect to siblings in the family con-
stellation. First-born and only Ss showed greater desire 
for affiliation than those Ss born in a family where other 
children precede. This was found to be true under conditions 
where other factors, including intensity of fear arousal, 
were equal. Furthermore, the increased desire for affilia-
tion of first-born Ss was found to be specifically related 
to the condition of relatively intense fear, i.e., the 
relationship did not hold for first-born Ss in the low fear 
condition. 
On the basis of the two residual interpretations, 
a) anxiety reduction and b) social comparison, Wrightsman (1960) 
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designed an experiment to show that being with others actually 
does reduce the individual's expressed fear intensity. In 
addition, he predicted that group affiliation would lead to 
increased uniformity of expressed fear reaction among the 
group members. This latter expectation was derived from 
Derivation D of Social Comparison theory, which states that 
the existence of discrepancy in the group will lead to action 
on the part of the members to reduce it. Fear was induced 
by threat of an unpleasant toxic reaction from a chemical in-
jection under the guise of a psychopharmacological experiment. 
Wrightsman (1960) found that anxiety reduction did occur 
in Ss choosing to be together but only for Ss first born in 
their families. No fear reduction was observed for later 
horns. With reference to his second prediction (concerning 
group pressures towards increased uniformity of expression 
of experienced intensity of emotion as a consequence of 
social comparison processes), he found significantly reduced 
variability of fear estimates in groups of Ss choosing to be 
together when compared with Ss choosing to be alone. 
Observing that previous workers (Schacter, 1959; 
Wrightsman, 1960) had not directly studied the effects of 
possessing objective knowledge of the fear intensity of self 
and others, Gerard and Rabbie (1961) manipulated this 
variable to test more directly the tenability of comparison 
theory as an explanation of the fear-affiliation relationship. 
According to Corollary IIB under Hypothesis II, a person 
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tends not to evaluate his emotion by comparison with others 
when an objective nonsocial basis for the evaluation of one's 
emotion is readily available. Using a slightly modified 
version of Schacter's (1959) fear arousing situation in which 
electric shock was threatened, the S was provided with in-
formation as to the presumed intensity of fear experienced 
by h~self and three other individuals seated in adjacent 
cubicles. Artificial norms were employed on an a priori 
assumption that the level of fear communicated by the norms 
was reasonably compatible with the threat instructions. A 
control group was provided in which the S was given the same 
threat instructions with, however, no normative information 
given as to how fearfully he and his peers were reacting. 
They found support for the prediction that a reduction in 
desire for affiliation would occur in the "information" 
group, as compared with the group having no information. 
Like Schacter, they found that ordinal birth position and, 
in addition, sex influenced this relationship. Males were 
found to show significantly less affiliation when compared 
with females despite the fact of equally intense fear reac-
tion as defined by the equality of changes in the level of 
their psychogalvanic reflex (PGR). Since Schacter had used 
only female Ss, this sex difference in desire for affiliation 
had not been noted previously. 
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c. Anxiety Arousal and Affiliation 
In an investigation using an experimental design 
similar in part to Schacter's (1959), Sarnoff and Zimbardo 
(1961) ~phasized the psychoanalytic distinction between 
fear and anxiety and treated these as two different emotions 
for making differential predictions of the strength of desire 
for affiliation. The study was an attempt to assess the 
breadth of generalization of Schacter's findings of a 
positive relationship between emotion arousal and affiliation. 
Prior to this study, fear (induced by threat of electric 
shock) was the only emotion to have been manipulated. Like 
Schacter, Sarnoff and Zimbardo conceived of fear as that 
state of emotion occurring after an anticipated exposure to 
pain. By contrast, anxiety was interpreted as a bodily 
response of fear without discernible external precipitating 
events, presumably brought about by the stimulation of some 
deeply repressed libidinal need. MOre precisely, anxiety was 
defined as the emotion aroused by the imminent threat of loss 
of control following the conscious emergence of a repressed 
impulse. High anxiety was produced experimentally by 
informing the S that he would be sucking on an infant 
nursing bottle as part of a psychophysiological experiment. 
Low anxiety was generated by telling the S he would be 
sucking and blowing on pipes and whistles. 
They predicted that anxious Ss would show reduced 
affiliation, hypothesizing that they would choose to be alone 
12 
in o~er to re-establish their threatened defenses. In the 
comparison population, high and low fear was aroused through 
threat of intense and weak electric shock respectively. A 
scale measure of the desire to be with others, similar to 
that used by Schacter (1959), was used to examine the 
strength of the affiliation motive. Their results seem to 
show that while the desire to affiliate increased as fear 
increased, the opposite was true for anxiety. As the emotion 
of anxiety increased, the desire to affiliate decreased. 
Like Schacter, they also found the order of birth position 
of siblings in a family was positively related to the desire 
for affiliation under threat of electric shock. The earlier 
the birth position, the stronger the desire for affiliation 
under the same emotion arousing condition. 
These findings seem to lend empirical support to the 
psychoanalytic distinction between fear and anxiety. At the 
same time, the results suggest that Social Comparison theory 
is not adequate to account for a generalized relationship 
between desire for affiliation and emotions other than fear. 
D. Present Status 
The studies discussed above represent all the empirical 
data directly concerned with this problem presently available 
to assess the validity of Social Comparison theory as it is 
used to elaborate the relationship between emotion arousal 
and affiliation. The findings are consistent for the parameter 
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of fear intensity. However, Sarnoff and Zimbardo's (1961) 
findings raise questions about the generality of Social Com-
parison theory beyond the specific emotion of fear. Their 
results lead us either to reject or reformulate Social Com-
parison theory as it relates to emotions in general, or, to 
reconcile their findings with other aspects of the theory. 
It is the present contention that Sarnoff and Z~bardo 
(1961) have overlooked the possibility of a factor operating 
in their experiment, such as a belief that one is reacting 
very differently from others, as elaborated in Hypothesis III 
of Social Comparison theory: the tendency to compare oneself 
with another decreases as the difference between himself and 
another increases. A person does not tend to evaluate his 
emotions by comparison with others Who are too divergent 
from himself. 
It is evident from a careful reading of Sarnoff and 
Zimbardo's (1961) theorizing that these authors are not 
altogether consistent in their reasoning as to the influence 
of anxiety on affiliation. 
Where their anxieties are aroused, people 
are more inclined to become preoccupied 
with the reassertion of inner self control 
than with modes of dealing with the anxiety 
evoking external object. Because the 
anxious individual tends to be aware of the 
element of inapSropriateness in his feelings, 
he will be loat e to communicate his anxiety 
to others. To avoid being ridiculed or 
censured, he will conceal emotion aroused 
by stimuli which he feels do not have a 
similar effect upon others and which he 
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feels ou~ht not so to upset h~. Thus 
when anx1ety is aroused, the individual 
would tend to seek isolation from others 
(p. 357). 
On the one hand they suggest that when anxiety has been 
aroused, isolation is sought in order to re-establish 
threatened defenses. This need to be alone to regain self 
control is offered as the basis of prediction of reduced 
desire for affiliation. On the other hand, immediately 
following this point, they suggest that anxious individuals 
tend to be aware of the element of inappropriateness in their 
reactions and consequently wish to avoid revealing this to 
others to avoid unfavorable comparison. In either case, they 
maintain that this desire for isolation is inconsistent with 
Schacter's (1959) derivations from the theory of Social 
Comparison. It is the present contention that Sarnoff and 
Zimbardo's (1961) anxious males chose to be alone because 
they felt different in their emotional reactions from their 
peers in accord with the operation of factors described in 
Hypothesis III of Social Comparison theory. In effect, the 
S may have felt that his emotional reaction was much more 
intense than others in this situation. In this way his 
desire for social comparison was reduced in connection with 
a group with whom he did not feel he shared this intensity 
of emotional experience. Consequently, the finding of a 
reduced desire for affiliation may be seen to be consistent 
with the previously discussed discrepancy hypothesis (III) 
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from Social Comparison theory. Clinical observation of 
group therapy also suggests that when individuals become 
aware that their peers, too, experience intense feelings 
about various aspects of their environment, they then become 
quite eager to share these experiences and, in effect, make 
social comparisons. These observations provide sufficient 
background for us to be able to offer a more precise state-
ment of the problem and hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER II 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
In the present investigation, primary interest is 
focused on the strength of desire for affiliation when the 
individual is given knowledge of discrepancy from his peers 
in the intensity of his fear reaction. Discrepancy occurs 
when the individual is given objective information leading 
him to believe that he is reacting with different (more or 
less) intensity than individuals otherwise like him. Consis• 
tent with the Schacter (1959) elaboration of the theory of 
Social Comparison, the greater the discrepancy from an appro-
priate normative group, the greater would be the influence on 
desire for affiliation. While the theory has not dealt with 
the effects of direction of discrepancy (more fear versus 
less fear), salient features of the emotion of fear suggest 
some consideration of the possible effects of direction of 
discrepancy as well as its magnitude or degree. We shall now 
consider the specific emotion of fear as it relates to the 
values of Western culture and Social Comparison theory. 
The expression or even acknowledgment of fear often 
evokes social disapproval. Long-established cultural roles 
make this especially true for males as compared to females 
due to differences in social~sexual role learning. Relatively 
speaking, males are raised. to be brave and fearless, while a 
more weak and helpless role in the face of danger is assigned 
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to women. Therefore, it is generally considered less desir-
able for males to feel or exhibit fear than for females. 
Consequently, while one would predict from Social Comparison 
theory a reduction in the need for affiliation in the 
presence of objective information regarding fear intensity, 
the foregoing consi4erations suggest that males would be 
more significantly influenced than females by the degree and 
direction of this discrepancy. For males, unfavorable dis-
crepancy (more fear than others) might be construed to be a 
threat to their masculine self image. Thus, males may show 
reduced affiliation in an effort to avoid revealing their 
fear and its consequence, unfavorable comparison. Some empi-
rical support for this asswaption is suggested by the Gerard 
and Rabbie (1961) study. Even in the absence of objective 
information regarding their fear level, highly fearful males 
were found to be less inclined to seek affiliation for social 
comparison than females. 
Fear has previously been defined as the emotional 
response to anticipated exposure to pain. One may conceptua" 
lize the condition of being very discrepant as leading to the 
production of fear of unfavorable comparison. As used here, 
fear of unfavorable comparison is defined as a type of fear 
resulting from a discrepancy between the level of fear ex-
perienced by the S and the way he believes he should be 
reacting to the threat. This self expectation may be based 
on two possible considerations: a) Knowledge of how most 
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others like himself would react, and b) an implicit judgement 
of how he would like to react according to his idealized con• 
ception of self. 
To summarize, fear of unfavorable comparison may be 
produced by self-other discrepancy and/or self-ideal discre-
pancy. In either case, the possibility of unfavorable 
comparison would be more germane for males than females. 
Most people appear to accept information provided by 
some authority regarding the reactions of others as an impor-
tant standard against which to judge the appropriateness and 
desirability of their own reactions. Since for experimental 
purposes the self-other discrepancy is easier to manipulate 
than the self-ideal discrepancy, it was decided to utilize 
the fonDer in the present research. 
Contrary to Sarnoff and Zimbardo (1961), the above 
formulation attempts to couch the consequences of what they 
have called anxiety (defined in a totally different theoreti-
cal framework, i.e., psychoanalysis) in terms consistent 
with the terms and the theorems of Social Comparison theory. 
Thus, comparison of aspects of the self with others may lead 
to fear of unfavorable comparison rather than what Sarnoff 
and Z~bardo (1961) called anxiety. Indeed, a close reading 
of their formulation suggests that their experimental result 
is based on a confounding of the operation for anxiety, and 
fear of unfavorable social comparison, and the explanation 
they offer is based more on the latter than the former. 
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The following general hypotheses are derived from the 
above discussion. In these hypotheses, degree of fear of 
electric shock is assumed to be constant in all conditions. 
1. Under conditions of zero discrepancy (as afraid as 
others), desire far affiliation will be reduced as 
compared with conditions of no information. 
This hypothesis is based on the reduced need for social com-
parison (Corollary IIB). 
2. Under conditions of unfavorable discrepancy (more 
afraid than others), desire for affiliation will be 
reduced as compared with zero discrepancy conditions 
(as afraid). 
This hypothesis is based upon Social Comparison hypothesis III, 
which states that people do not seek social comparison with 
others believed to be reacting differently from themselves. 
It is also predicted on the grounds that the S will wish to 
avoid the unfavorable comparison which would be engendered 
by affiliation. 
3. Under conditions of unfavorable discrepancy, desire 
for affiliation will be reduced as compared with 
conditions of favorable discrepancy (less afraid). 
This is predicted on the grounds that while these groups both 
believe themselves to be discrepant, implying a reduction in 
affiliation in accord with Social Comparison theory, the 
favorable discrepancy group would not have the additional 
threat of fear of unfavorable comparison incurring reduced 
affiliation. 
4. Under conditions of unfavorable discrepancy, men 
will exhibit less desire for affiliation than women. 
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This is due to the greater salience of the emotion of fear 
for men than women in our culture. 
With regard to the last hypothesis, there is the possi-
bility that belief in being less afraid than peers might lead 
to increased affiliation for reasons other than the desire to 
evaluate their emotion. Hypothesis IV from Social Comparison 
theory states that there is a unidirectional drive upwards 
in the case of abilities, i.e., there is a positive value in 
performing at a superior level. If the control of one's 
fear reaction is conceived as an ability, then an increase in 
affiliation might be anticipated as a consequence of the S's 
desire to display to peers his relatively superior self 
control. Since there is no means of ascertaining at this 
point the relative strength of the affiliative reducing 
effect of discrepancy and the opposing affiliative increasing 
effect of superior control, no further predictions involving 
the comparison of the favorable discrepancy are made. 
The following experiment is designed to investigate the 
above hypothesis. Following the arousal of fear in all Ss 
through threat of painful electric shock, objective informa-
tion concerning the S's own fear level as well as that of his 
peers was to be communicated to some and not to others. 
Those Ss receiving information were to be placed into one of 
three discrepancy conditions according to the nature of the 
objective information given: zero discrepancy, unfavorable 
discrepancy, or favorable discrepancy. Zero discrepancy Ss 
21 
were to be told that they were as afraid as their peers. 
Unfavorable discrepancy Sa were to be told that they were 
considerably more fearful than their peers, while favorable 
discrepancy Ss were to be told that they were considerably 
less fearful than their peers. Following the establishment 
of the various discrepancy conditions, the measure of the 
dependent variable was to be obtained, i.e., the S's strength 
of desire to affiliate with others in this experiment. All 
four experimental groups were to be divided into equal 
numbers of male and female Ss to evaluate the effect of sex 
on affiliation in the various conditions. Only Ss first born 
in their families were to be used in order to avoid the con-
founding affects of this variable. Actual fear arousal (as 
opposed to the false norms to be communicated to the Ss) and 
general affiliative tendency (as measured by the Affiliation 
Scale of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule) were to 
be evaluated to ascertain that the results were not the 
product of either of these factors. 
A. Operational Hypotheses and Design Summary 
1. Mean affiliation scores will be smaller for the 
zero discrepancy group than the no information 
group. 
2. Mean affiliation scores will be smaller for the 
unfavorable discrepancy group than the zero 
discrepancy group. 
3. Mean affiliation scores will be smaller for the 
unfavorable discrepancy group than the favorable 
discrepancy group. 
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4. Mean affiliation scores will be smaller for males 
than females in the unfavorable discrepancy group. 
The proposed experimental design may be seen in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIG!l 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE • .AFFILIATION SCORES 
Fear Intensitz Information 
Favorable Zero Unfavorable 
Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy 
Male 30-5c}J 50-50 10-50 
Female 30-50 5o ... 5o 10-50 
N' o Ini' orm.a t ion 
-
(Control) 
!/In each case, the first figure of the two is the level of 
:t'ear attributed to the S, while the second is the level of 
fear attributed to others. 
A. Subjects 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD OF PROCEDURE 
Forty-eight male and 48 female Ss ranging in age from 17 
to 23 were randomly selected from a large pool of volunteers 
11 from three Boston University General Psychology classes 
With four experimental conditions for each sex, there were 
eight randomly assigned groups of 12 Ss each. Ss were drawn 
only from among first-year psychology students (freshmen and 
sophomores) with the expectation that they would be ignorant 
of previous fear-affiliation studies. Experimental naivete 
in this area was felt to be essential, since any acquaintance 
with previous studies might tend to decrease belief in the 
forthcoming experimental deception. All Ss were under the 
impression that they were volunteering for an experiment 
dealing with physiological psychology. In addition, since 
previous investigations had demonstrated a positive relation-
ship between ordinal birth position and affiliation under 
conditions of intense fear, ordinal birth position was held 
constant by restricting the selection of Ss to those who were 
first born or only children in their families. 
!/I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Irving Wolf 
and Professor William Mackavay for making their students 
available for this research. 
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B.. Experimental Procedure 
Both prior to and during the S's active participation 
in the experiment, he was subtly confronted with several 
events designed to lend additional credence to the psycho-
physiological character of the experiment and to further en-
hance the illusion that others were participating in this 
study at the same time as himself. The credibility of the 
latter idea was essential, since the S had to believe that 
other fearful students were present for affiliation when the 
time for that choice arrived. 
Individual appointments were arranged with the S by 
postcard, urging him to be on time because of the "tight" 
scheduling of Ss for this project. On arrival, the S was 
met and taken to a door displaying a large sign reading, 
"Psychophysiological Laboratory No. 3". Two other doors on 
either side of the actual experimental room had similar signs 
identifying those rooms as Psychophysiological Laboratories 
No. 2 and No. 4. In addition, just beyond the laboratory 
door was a large, conspicuous sign reading "Waiting Rooms" 
with an arrow pointing down the corridor. 
On entering the laboratory, the Ss could see a table 
exhibiting a variety of electrical items (see Figure I). The 
most attention compelling items among these were a tape re-
corder and a 24x24x4 inch black box with numerous toggle 
switches, calibrating screws, and several meters, all labeled 
with descriptive phrases like "Shock Ampere Adjustor," "Voltage 
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FIGURE 2 
THE APPARATUS 
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Regulator," "Reactivity Calibrator," etc. Two pairs of 
electrodes were readily visible coming from this box, and the 
apparatus was obviously wired to the tape recorder and to the 
wall socket. The black box labeled "Psycho-Galvanic Reflex 
Recorder No • .3" was constructed to look like an impressive 
and convincing piece of apparatus which might be used in a 
psychophysiological experiment. In addition to helping 
create a convincing facade, the box contained a simple elec-
trical circuit. This was so designed that, depending on 
which of three switches was closed, a four-inch volt-ohm-
milliameter (VOM) scale would read .30, 50, or 70 ohms when-
ever a fourth switch labeled "Fear Reactivity was closed in 
view of the S. Simultaneously, one of three colored pilot 
lights would blink on above the VOM scale. The VOM and the 
row of pilot lights were prominently identified as the "Vi-
sual Fear Indicator." Beneath each pilot light was the 
easily discernible legend: "0-40 Low Fear," "40-60 Average 
Fear, " and "60-100 High Fear.'' 
Upon entering the room, the Ss were told the following: 
Please sit down, and thank you for coming. 
Has anyone at all discussed this experiment 
with you? We want you to know that while 
you have volunteered for this project you 
are not committed to it, that is, you are 
free to withdraw from the project at any 
point that you might wish. Of course, we 
hope that you will not do this, but we wish 
you to know that this is your privilege. 
Now let me tell you a bit about our appara-
tus. This apparatus (motioning to the 
black box) was designed and built to measure 
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one of your basic psychophysiological 
functions, and that is your skin poten-
tial. By means of these recording elec-
trodes (pointing), we take a continuous 
reading of a tiny electrical signal which 
is always on the surface of your skin, 
feed it into this apparatus which alters 
it, amplifies it, and then feeds it into 
the tape recorder where we have a perma-
nent record that can be examined more 
minutely when we have more time. 
At this point I an going to place this 
recording device on your hands since I 
want to establish a base line responsi-
vity while we talk. (Two electrodes were 
strapped to S with elastics and the tape 
recorder started). Our experiment falls 
in the general area of physiological 
psychology. 
As you may know, one branch of physio-
logical psychology is concerned with the 
reactions of the sense or~ans to various 
kinds of stimulation. Th~s present ex-
periment deals with the skin as a receptor 
of noxious stimulation. We are interested 
in studying individual differences to dif-
ferent stimuli of varying intensity applied 
to it. 
While much is already known, there has been 
a good deal of controversy about the rela-
tive sensitivity of the fingers as compared 
to the palms and upper surfaces of the hand. 
This experiment will help to provide data 
which may be able to resolve some of these 
questions, and also perhaps permit us to 
eventually draw a detailed map of the rela-
tive pain sensitivity of the human hand. 
The stimulus that will be employed is elec-
tric shock. By means of these electrodes 
(pointing to a pair of sharp looking elec-
trodes wired to the apparatus) we will 
apply a series of variable and moderately 
painful electric shocks to the various 
parts of your hands, fingers, fingertips, 
etc. Each one will be about one second 
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in duration, and I'm telling you about 
these in advance so that you will be pre-
pared for then since some of them will be 
quite sharp and uncomfortable. They will 
hurt; however, we feel that if we are to 
learn anything that will increase our 
understanding in this area, some of the 
shocks must be intense. However, I can 
assure you they will not cause any perma-
nent damage or really injure you in any way. 
With the S's apprehension aroused, he was informed that 
a measure of the amount of perspiration on his fingertips 
would be taken since it was related to certain variables in 
the study. The S's fingertips were coated with a chemical 
solution, and he was then required to hold these fingers on 
some specially treated paper for a three-minute period at a 
constant pressure of 16 oz. The latter was accomplished by 
clipping the treated paper to the top of a small spring-
operated postage scale, thus permitting regulation by the S. 
With the perspiring S pressing on the postage meter, an 
electronic tllner was started to designate the three minute-
interval. At this point the E excused h~self, informing 
the S that he had to go and check with a couple of the other 
Ss who were also involved in this same experiment. The S 
was assured that the E would be back before the three minutes 
were up on the electronic timer. The exit was arranged to 
assist in the illusion that other researchers and other Ss 
were in the nearby vicinity. Upon returning, the E finished 
obtaining the perspiration print, and continued the decep-
tion with the followingmdnO.~ogue. 
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In exper~ents utilizing electric shock, 
it is usual for the Ss to experience some 
fear. In addition to measuring your dif-
ferential responsiveness, this recording 
device also measures the extent of your 
fear concerning the coming electric shocks 
on a zero to 100 scale. We make a record 
of this because it is known that a S's 
fear level may influence the threshold of 
his cutaneous pain reaction. With this in 
mind, we frequently have to correlate these 
two things in our analysis of the data. 
While the recording instrument is quite 
accurate, as a double check and perhaps to 
see how well you can estimate your own fear 
level, I would like you to Check off on this 
rating scale the approximate amount of ap-
prehension you feel regarding the coming 
series of electric shocks·•. 
At this point the S was given the Apprehension Intensity 
Rating Scale and told that he may check it anywhere at all 
along the line that he feels best describes how apprehen-
sive he is at that moment. After he had made a check on 
the scale, the S was instructed to drop it in a box be-
hind him where several others like it were also visible, as 
if from previous Ss. No interest whatsoever was shown in 
the S's assessment at that point, since, having made the 
necessary instrospective assessment of fear required to test 
the equality of fear arousal between groups, the need was to 
focus the S's attention on the fear information to be com-
municated by the apparatus. At this point, several toggle 
switches were closed in view of the S and, depending on the 
S's information condition assignment, the large scale pointer 
read either 30, SO, or 70, and the appropriate low, average, 
or high pilot light went on. In the no information condition, 
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nothing visual occurred after the toggles were closed. The 
S was left to assume that through this alteration of circuits, 
the information was being taken down on the tape recorder. 
In the information conditions, the S's attention was drawn 
even more to the apparatus by the E's peering intently at it 
and making paper and pencil notations. With the apparatus 
still reading the desired fear level, the E again reiterated 
that a record is made of this because it has been found that 
the amount of fear influences the sensitivity measures. In 
the zero discrepancy condition, the S was told the following: 
However, in your case we will not have to 
take this into consideration in our pre-
parations, or analysis since your fear 
reaction is about SO, as you can see 
(pointing), which is about the level of 
fear shown by most fellows (girls) like 
yourself in this experiment. 
In the unfavorable discrepancy condition, the S was told the 
following: 
In your case we may have to take this into 
consideration in our preparations since 
your fear reaction is at 70 as you can see 
(pointing), considerably higher than the 
50 that most fellows (girls) like your-
self show in this experiment. 
In the favorable discrepancy condition, the S was told the 
following: 
In your case we may have to take this into 
consideration in our preparations and analy-
sis since your fear reaction is about 30, as 
you can see (pointing), which is considerably 
less than the 50 that most fellows (girls) 
like yourself show in this experiment. 
31 
Ss in the zero information condition were told nothing fur-
ther. Altering the circuits to their original non-reading 
positions, the experimental instructions continued: 
At this point there will be about a ten-
minute delay while I check the apparatus 
and calibrate the recorder for your in-
dividual responsivenes•. We have made 
arrangements for you to wait nearby in 
comfortable rooms equipped with magazines. 
You may choose to wait with a couple of 
other fellows (girls) who have had their 
base lines recorded and are waiting to 
begin the experiment--you may chat about 
the experiment if you wish, or you may 
choose to wait in another room by your-
self as you may wish to utilize the time 
for your own purposes. Which would you 
prefer? (The S then makes his choice.) 
One of the University's social psycho-
logists, Dr. Stone, is interested in the 
decision making process and is doing some 
research in thatarea (said while reaching 
for the appropriate scale). He has ex-
pressed an interest-in the strength of a 
S's decision to wait together or alone 
in our experiment and asked me to have 
you check the strength of your preference 
on this scale. The extreme left indi-
cates a very weak preference for being 
with others (by yourself), while the ex-
treme right indicates a very strong pre-
ference to be with others (by yourself). 
You may check the scale at any point at 
all along the line to indicate the strength 
of your decision using the described points 
as rough guides. It will not be necessary 
to put your name on this paper, since Dr. 
Stone is only interested in group data. 
At this point, with the above scale ehecked, all Ss were told 
the real purpose of the experiment, and encouraged to cathart 
their feelings to reduce any residual tension. Every attempt 
was made to make clear to the S that the questions which were 
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to follow were not part of the experimental procedure proper, 
but only some subsidiary analysis to provide a check on the 
data already collected. Having clarified this point, all Ss 
were asked the same series of questions, aimed primarily at 
assessing their acceptance of the experimental conditions. 
Upon completing the questionaire, and enlisting the S's 
cooperation in keeping silent about what had taken place in 
the experiment, he was taken to another room to fill out the 
Edwards Personal·Praifereni:e ~chedule in private. 
c. Rationale for the Choice of Normative Information 
In all cases of information communication, 50 on a 0-100 
scale was arbitrarily chosen as a reasonable (if false) norm 
to be given to the Ss. Plus or minus 20 was the specific 
discrepancy constant utilized to create the alternative dis-
crepancy conditions. The norm and the amount of discrepancy 
delected were necessarily somewhat arbitrary. Little pre-
vious data was available to serve as a guide. It was felt 
desirable to minimize the possibility of arousing subjective 
conflict between the fear intensity information provided by 
the E, and the S's implicit assessment of his level of fear. 
It was assumed, on the basis of some meager pilot data, 
that most people think of themselves and others as being 
average, i.e., around 50 on a 0-100 scale, with a tendency to 
distribute themselves normally. Also, Gerard and Rabbie (1961) 
obtained mean fear estimates of 40 and 60 respectively, from 
low and high fear Ss threatened with weak and strong electric 
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shock. From this, it was decided that 50 would represent an 
appropriate compromise no~ for the present experiment. 
The choice of a discrepancy constant was made on the 
basis that it had to be large enough to invoke the feeling 
of being different, and yet not so large as to provoke dis-
belief and suspicion on the part of the s. This risk was 
minimized by the fact that very likely the S had little expe-
rience with this type of electrophysiological assessment and 
was dependent upon the E for a meaningful interpretation of 
its significance. 
D. The Experimental Measures 
1. ~ Appraisal .2£. Actual ~ Intensity 
The actual level of fear was asswned to be a constant 
between groups since all Ss were exposed to the same fear 
producing conditions, and treatment assignment was made at 
random. Two measures of the S's actual fear level were ob-
tained to check the adequacy of the assumed random assign-
ment. The first was an apprehension intensity rating scale 
designed for this study. The second was a physiological 
measure of emotional arousal known as the Colorimetric 
Index of Pa~ar Sweating. 
The Apprehension Intensity Self Rating Scale was designed 
to yield a score between 0 and 100 depending on the S's intro-
spective assessment of the intensity of his emotional reaction. 
As inducement to accurate introspective report, the S 
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was led to believe that the psychophysiological measuring 
apparatus, to which he was wired, would also give us an accu-
rate measure of his fear reaction and that his appraisal was 
being obtained to see how well he could estimate with 
accuracy his own fear level. This procedure was utilized 
on the basis of Krause's (1961) recommendation that in the 
assessment of transitory anxiety states, S's introspective 
report is generally one of the more valid and reliable 
measures of fear, provided that there is some motive for 
accurate reporting. The attempt was made to provide such a 
motive in two ways; a) by focusing on a S's ability to 
accurately judge his fear level, and b) by suggesting that 
since "the machine" would provide an accurate appraisal of 
his fear level, there was little point in not giving an 
honest estimate. 
The scale consisted of a continuous line eight and one-
half inches long, marked at five points as follows: "not at 
all uneasy," "mildly uneasy," "moderately uneasy," "very 
uneasy,'' and "extremely uneasy'~· • (see Appendix A) • These 
five points represented correspondingly o, 25, so, 75, and 
100 on the scale. The S was told he could check the scale 
at any point along the line since it was continuous. Scores 
were obtained by placing a corresponding eight and one-half 
inch line, divided into one hundred units parallel to the 
fear scale, and noting the numerical value at the point 
checked by the s. 
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The Colorimetric Index measuring emotional arousal has 
been well described by Mowrer {1951). The technique was 
selected for use in this experiment because it provided a 
simple and ready means of obtaining a second and independent 
estimate of the level of "actual" fear arousal. The adminis-
tration is outlined in detail in Appendix c. Two finger-
prints resulted, whose density varied positively with the 
amount of perspiration on the S's fingers. The arithmetric 
value of these prints was obtained by means of a densitometer. 
Fundamentally, the densitometer consisted of a con-
tinuously variable light source located directly above a self-
generating photo cell whose output was wired to a 0-40 
micro-ammeter. After varying the illumination until the 
photo cell generated exactly enough current to produce a full 
scale deflection of the micro-ammeter pointer, the fingerprint 
was placed between the photo cell and the light. Depending 
on the density of the print, the amount of light reaching 
the photo cell was reduced, with a corresponding reduction 
in the current output of the photo cell. Because of this 
reduced current output, there is a lower micro-ammeter 
reading yielding sweat scores ranging from 39.5 mic~oamperes 
for an exceedingly light print, to 10 microamperes or less 
for a very dark one. 
2. Assessment ~the Strength of the Affiliative Tendency 
The dependent variable was the strength of expressed 
desire for affiliation. Isolation and affiliation were 
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assigned as the two extremes of a unidimensional continuous 
scale, as had Sarnoff and Z~bardo (1961) and Schacter (1959). 
It was administered after the S was told that there would be 
a waiting period before the shock and that he could pass this 
tUne alone or in the company of others who were also waiting 
to be shocked. If the S elected to wait with others, he was q 
given a scale marked "Decision Making Data $cale" (see 
Appendix B). This scale was sUnilar to the Apprehension 
Intensity Rating Scale in general appearance and construction 
except that rather than five points, it was anchored at three 
as follows: "No Preference for Waiting with Other Subjects," 
"Moderate Preference for Waiting with Other Subjects," and 
"Strong Preference for Waiting with Other Subjects." No 
other verbal markers were employed on the scale, in order to 
encourage the S to see the scale as continuous rather than as 
a discreet series of points. While possibly increasing the 
risk of ambiguity of interpretation by the s, the gain was 
felt to be worth the risk. 
If the S elected to wait alone, he was given a different 
form containing a parallel scale except that the three 
anchoring points read: "No Preference for Waiting Alone," 
"Moderate Preference for Waiting Alone," and "Strong 
Preference for Waiting Alone." The S's score on one or the 
other scale was obtained in the same manner as previously 
described for the Apprehension Intensity Rating Scale, which 
yielded a score from 0 to 100. 
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Since desire for isolation and affiliation were assumed 
to represent the two extremes of a unidimensional continuum, 
the data from the alone and together scales were treated as 
though they were obtained from a single scale of affiliative 
preference, ranging from minus 100 (strong preference for 
waiting alone) through zero (indifference) to plus 100 (strong 
preference forwaiting together. Accordingly, S's affilia-
tive preference scores ranged from minus 100 to plus 100. 
This score was the measure of the dependent variable. Scores 
were sumed algebraically, and divided by number of Ss to 
yield mean scores for each group. 
The two-part scaling procedure was used in keeping with 
previous researchers, who also asked the S to choose between 
alone and together and then to indicate the strength of that 
preference (Gerard and Rabbie, 1961; Sarnoff and Zimbardo, 
1961). It may be asked whether the same scores would have 
resulted if the two scales had been joined end to end and 
presented as a single scale reading at the extremes: "Strong 
preference for not being together" and "Strong preference for 
being together." Would the S have perceived the opposing 
sides of this combined scale differently from the alone or 
together counterparts that were used. It was assumed that 
there would not be any difference. While there is no data 
available to support the contention, there does not seem to 
be any strong argument against it. 
It may also be observed that Ss were not given the 
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opportunity to check both scales. It is conceivable that 
some Ss might have wished both to be alone and to be with 
others in varying degrees. The present method of measure-
ment of preference for affiliation would yield only the 
resultant of these conflicting forces; however, this factor 
in itself would not seem to oppose the validity of this 
technique for assessing the overall strength of desire to be 
with others. 
3. Other Contpol Measures 
After revealing that the experiment was actually 
designed to examine the fear-affiliation relationship, a 
questionnaire was verbally administered in an attempt to 
assess the S's acceptance of the various experimental decep-
tions, since disbelief would imply non-validity of the 
dependent measure. In addition, the S was asked to recall 
what he had been thinking and feeling at various points 
during the procedure, as well as the different reasons for 
his choice to affiliate or wait alone. The questionnaire is 
reproduced in full in Appendix F. 
General affiliative tendency (as a personality trait) 
was assumed to be constant through random assignment of Ss to 
conditions. However, since it could be an important factor 
influencing the dependent variable (experimental affiliation) 
independent of the experimental manipulation, this assumption 
was checked by comparison of scores on the Affiliation Scale 
of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (1950). 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter will report the results of statistical 
analyses of the measure of the dependent variable, which 
support or fail to support the various predictions derived 
earlier. Analyses of measures of control variables bearing 
on the adequacy of the experimental design will also be 
presented. 
A. Analysis of the Effects of Information Conditions 
The first hypothesis stated that the strength of desire 
for affiliation would be less for the zero discrepancy condi-
tion than for the no information condition due to the dif-
ference in possession of objective comparison data. Analysis 
of the data supports this prediction. The mean affiliation 
scores for the four information conditions are given in 
Table 1. Table 2 presents the number of Ss choosing to be 
together and those choosing to be alone in each experimental 
condition. A two-way analysis of variance for information 
conditions by sex groups is pre•ented in Table 3. It can be 
seen that the effects for information conditions yielded an 
F ratio of 9.14, which is significant beyond the .01 level. 
To find which information groups contribute to the significant 
F, Table 4 reports the results of t tests for independent 
samples between all possible pairs of the above means. The 
zero discrepancy group mean of 9.4 is lower than the no 
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Sex 
Male 
Female 
TABLE 1 
MEAN AFFILIATION SCORES FOR THE FOUR INFORMATION 
CONDITIONS BY SEX GROUPS 
Favorable Zero Unfavorable No 
Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy Information 
-1·5 16.1 65.4 48.3 
-20.~0 2.7 49.1 48.1 
TOTAL 6.8 9.4 57.3 48.2 
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Total 
37.5 
23.1 
30.3 
TABLE 2 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS CHOOSING ALONE VERSUS TOOETHER 
IN THE FOUR INFORMATION COJIDITIONS BY SEX GROUPS 
Favorable Zero Unfavorable No 
Sex Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy Information 
* ** A T A T ! T A T 
- - - - -
Male 6 t. 4 8 0 12 0 12 
Female 2 10 5 7 1 11 1 11 
TOTAL 8 16 9 15 1 2.3 1 2.3 
* Alone 
** Togetbtr 
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Total 
48 
48 
96 
TABLE 3 
TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF EXPERIMENTAL AFFILIATION 
SCORES FOR THE FOUR INFORMATION CONDITION'S BY SEX GROUPS 
Source of Mean 
Variation dt Square F p 
Information Groups 3 16494.17 9.14 .01 
Sex Groups 1 a.8o -<1 n.s. 
Information x Sex 3 2402.90 1.13 n.s. 
Within Groups]/ 88 1803.00 
TO'l'AL 95 
1/Tbe assumption of homogeneous variances is not tenable in 
this analysis; however, the 9.14 value of F obtained is 
over twice that necessary for significance at the .01 
level, indicating a difference between means as well as 
variances. 
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TABLE 4 
TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEAN 
EXPERIMENTAL AFFILIATION SCORES FOR ALL COMBINATIONS 
OF THE UNFAVORABLE DISCREPANCY, ZERO DISCREPANCY, 
FAVORABlE DISCREPANCY, AND NO INFORMATION CONDITIONS 
Condition 
Zero Discrepancy 
No Information 
Unfavorable Discrepancy 
Zero Discrepancy 
Unfavorable Discrepancy 
Favorable Discrepancy 
24 
24 
Mean 11 t dfy 
2.98 2.3 
6.8 
p 
Favorable Discrepancy 
No Information 
3.16 2.3 .01 
Favorable Discrepancy 
Zero Discrepancy 
Unfavorable Discrepancy 
No Information 
!It (.05) 2.3d.f. = 2.069 
t (.01) 2.3d.f. = 2.807 
48.2 
0.18 23 n.s. 
0.91 2.3 n.s. 
g/In accord with recommended procedure in the case of non" 
homogeneous variances, only one-half the usual number of 
de§rees of freedom are employed here in referring to the 
"t table for significance of differences between these 
means (Edwards, 1950). 
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information group mean of 48.2. This difference is signifi~ 
cant beyond the .01 level (Table 4). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the unfavorable discrepancy 
group would demonstrate less desire for affiliation than the 
zero discrepancy group as a consequence of discrepancy in 
fear intensity and desire to avoid unfavorable comparison. 
The mean affiliation scores for the unfavorable discrepancy 
and zero discrepancy groups were 57.3 and 9.4 respectively 
(Table l). It is ~ediately apparent that hypothesis 2 is 
not supported, since the means differ in the opposite direc-
tion from that predicted. In fact, a t test of significance 
of difference between these two means reveals that this 
reversal is significant beyond the .01 level (Table 4). 
The third hypothesis stated that the mean affiliation 
scores would be smaller under conditions of unfavorable dis-
crepancy than under conditions of favorable discrepancy due 
to the wish of ~he unfavorable group to avoid unfavorable 
comparison. It can be observed in Table l that the unfavor" 
able discrepancy group has a mean affiliation score of 57.3. 
As with the previous hypothesis, it is again suggested that 
a result opposite to that predicted has been obtained. A 
test of significance between these means yields a t of 4.46, 
significant beyond the .01 level (Table 4). 
B. Analysis of the Sex Groups and Condition by Sex 
Interactions 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that mean affiliation scores for 
45 
46 
males would be smaller than for females in the unfavorable 
discrepancy condition by virtue of the greater salience of 
fear of unfavorable comparison for males. Table 1 presents 
the mean affiliation scores for sex groups in the four e xperi-
mental conditions. A two-way analysis of variance of the four 
treatment conditions partitioned for the effects of sex 
yielded an F ratio for sex groups, which does not approach 
statistical significance (Table 3). The interaction of sex 
and discrepancy yielded an F ratio of 1.13 (Table 3). Since 
an F value of 2.72 is required for significance at the .os 
level, there is no evidence to indicate the presence of any 
interaction. Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
c. Analysis of the Randomization of Control Variables 
Statistical examination of the two control variables, 
actual fear intensity and general affiliative tendency, was 
undertaken to assess the possibility that experimental 
affiliation level was varying as a function of one or both of 
these. The mean scores obtained from the self-rating scale 
measure of fear for the eight experimental groups are shown 
in Table s. A two-way analysis of variance of these means 
yielded no significant F ratios (Table 6). 
The eight group means obtained from the Colorimetric 
Index of fear arousal are given in Table 7. In every instance, 
it can be observed that the males have lower scores 
(suggesting more fear) than the females. A two-way analysis 
of variance of these means yielded an F of 7.00 for sex groups, 
TABLE 5 
MEAN SEU' RATiliGS OF FEAR FOR THE FOUR 
INFORMATION CONDITIONS BY SEX GROUPS 
Favorable Zero Unfavorable No 
Sex Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy Information 
Male 39.8 43.8 33.8 30.9 
Female 37.8 37.8 44.5 47.5 
TOTAL 38.8 40.8 39.2 39.2 
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Total 
37.1 
41.9 
39.5 
TABLE 6 
TWO-WAY AN.A:&YSIS OF VARIANCE OF SELF RATED FEAR SCORES 
FOR THE FOUR IIFORMATION CONDI'riONS BY SEX GROUPS 
Source o~ Mean 
Variation d1" Square F 
Information Groups 3 19.00 <1 
Sex Groups 1 570.01 1.69 
Information x Sex 3 668.73 1.99 
Within Groups 88 335.52 
TOTAL 95 
48 
p 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
• 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
TABLE 7 
MEAN SCORES FROM THE COLORIMETRIC INDEX OF 
FEAR AROUSAL FOR THE FOUR INFORMATION 
CONDITIONS BY SEX GROUPS 
Favorable Zero Unfavorable No 
Discrepano7 Discrepancy Discrepancy Information 
27.9 24.3 25.6 25.3 
32.8 29.6 31.7 25.5 
TOTAL 30.4 27.0 28.7 25.4 
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Total 
25.8 
29.9 
27.9 
which is significant beyond the .01 level (Table 8). Neither 
the F for information condition nor the F for interaction was 
found to be significant. 
This significant difference, suggesting that males are 
more fearful than females in this situation, is difficult to 
interpret, considering that no sex differences were found with 
respect to the measure of rated fear or the measure of ex-
perimental affiliation. There does not seem to be any 
adequate reason for anticipating that males would be more 
afraid than females in this threat situation. 
There is no published data Which bears on the question 
of whether a difference between sexes on the Colorimetric 
Index represents an actual difference in fear level or whether 
it may simply represent a difference in physiological 
reactivity with respect to sweating in males and females. 
Research proceeding concurrently with this study suggests the 
1 lk . !I ?:/. . atter. Wo 1n, G. , and Haywood, H. 1n two 1ndependent 
studies observed a similar sex difference in scores from the 
Colorimetric Index where none had been anticipated and where 
other measures had not revealed any difference in tension 
arousal. On the basis of these other two independent empirical 
findings, it is suggested that the observed significant 
difference between sexes in amount of sweat is related more 
to a physiological difference in males and females than any 
difference in the actual amount of fear provoked in the two 
!/Personal Communication, 1962. 
?:/Personal Communication, 1962. 
50 
TABLE 8 
TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE COLORIMETRIC INDEX 
OF FEAR AROUSAL FOR THE FOUR INFORMATION 
CONDITIONS BY SEX GROUPS 
Source of Mean 
Variation Square F 
Information Groups 3 109.63 1.89 
Sex Groups 1 405.oo 7.00 
p 
n.s. 
.o1 
Information x Sex 3 49.62 <.1 n.s. 
Within Groups 88 57.81 
TOTAL 95 
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two sexes in this situation. Further research is indicated 
on this question. In any case, the lack of significant dif-
ference among information groups supports the contention of 
adequate randomization among the information conditions. 
For the general affiliation measure, each S's raw score 
on the Affiliation scale of the Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule was converted to a percentile score by means of 
standardized tables developed by Edwards (1954). These mean 
percentile scores are presented in Table 9. A two-way 
analysis of variance of the mean percentile scores of the 
eight experimental groups failed to produce any significant 
F (Table 10). Thus, nothing in the analysis of this variable 
suggests failure to achieve the necessary randomization. 
D. Supplementary Observations and Analyses 
In an effort to shed some light on the lack of exper~en­
tal confirmation of the various discrepancy hypotheses, data 
from the postexperimental questionnaire were examined to see 
how well other experimental conditions had been achieved. 
The questionnaire data are summarized in Appendix G. It is 
obviously imperative in the discrepancy groups that the Ss 
believe the discrepancy producing information given to them. 
Inspection of Ss' questionnaire responses indicated that all 
the Ss verbalized their acceptance of the psychophysiological 
interest of the study. In response to direct questions, all 
Ss indicated their acceptance of the objective fear intensity 
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TABLE 9 
11 
MEAN PERCENTilE SCORES OF GENERAL .AFFILIATIVE TENDENCY 
FOR THE FOUR INFORMATION CONDITIONS BY SEX GROUPS 
Favorable Zero Unfavorable Ho 
Sex Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy Information Total 
Male 37.8 40.1 42.8 5o.8 42.9 
Female 41.9 45.8 45.8 30.1 40.9 
TOTAL 39.9 43.0 44.3 40.5 41.9 
1/Edwards Personal Preference Schedule 
TABLE 10 
TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PERCENTILE SCORES 
OF GENERAL AFFILIATIVE TENDENCY FOR THE 
FOUR INFORMATION CONDI'l'IOllS BY SEX GROUPS 
Source of Mean 
Variation d.f Square F 
Information Groups 3 57.71 <1 
Sex Groups 1 336.02 <1 
Information x Sex 3 897 • .34 1.04 
Within Groups 88 861.50 
TOTAL 95 
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p 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
information provided by the apparatus. At the same time, 
many indicated that they felt puzzled by the fear ratings 
(70-high:, 50-average, and 30-low) designated for them by the 
apparatus and felt that the ratings conflicted with their own 
internal assessment of fear intensity. When asked, many Ss 
asserted that they felt "conflict" between the two assess-
ments of fear. This condition of conflict suggests the 
operation of a different kind of discrepancy than that mani-
pulated in this experiment, i.e., a self-self rather than a 
self-other discrepancy. 
In a recent publication, Festinger (1957) speaks of the 
concept of dissonance as a motivating force occurring as the 
product of two or more inconsistent cognitions (beliefs) 
held by the individual. Consonance is described as the ab-
sence of inconsistency between related cognitions. In the 
present study, such inconsistent or dissonant beliefs may 
exist between the objective and subjective fear estimates 
held by the s. 
The existence of dissonance, being psycho-
logically uncomfortable, will motivate the 
person to behavior that will reduce dis-
sonance and achieve consonance--in short, 
that the existence of non-fitting relations 
among cognitions is a motivating factor 
in its own right (p. 3). 
Research has demonstrated that one means of reducing 
dissonance is to seek additional information which may help 
to reconcile the inconsistent beliefs (Adams, 1961; 
Festinger, 1957). Social comparison, with its resultant 
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social support, provides one form of such information. Thus, 
for "dissonant" Ss in the present experiment, one way of 
obtaining information and support might be to discuss the 
experiment with others Who had been in the same situation in 
the hope of reaching a consonant cognition by means of 
social support. The foregoing discussion implies that 
dissonance and discrepancy may be confounded in the present 
experiment. 
In order to examine the effects of favorable, zero, and 
unfavorable discrepancy independently of the possible con-
founding effects of dissonance, the 24 Ss in each of the 
three discrepancy conditions were dichotomized according to 
whether they had verbalized conflict between the two sources 
of information concerning their fear reactions. Sex groups 
have been combined for this classification, since they had 
not previously shown any differences in desire for affilia-
tion. Table 11 shows the unequal number of Ss in the six 
cells resulting from the reclassification, as well as their 
mean affiliation scores. 
With the possible confounding effects of dissonance 
removed, a second examination of the effects of discrepancy 
was undertaken. Due to the now unequal sample sizes, the 
very small size of some cells, and the tendency for the cell 
variances to be nonhomogeneous, it was decided to use a non-
parametric analysis to avoid the more stringent assumptions 
of the parametric technique. The Mann-Whitney U Test 
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TABLE 11 
PROPORTION OF SUBJECTS AND THEIR MEAN AFFILIATION SCORES 
IN EACH INFORMATION CONDITION WITH AND WITHOUT DISSONANCE 
Dissonant Non-Dissonant 
lio. of Mean No. of Mean 
Condition Subjects At:f'iliation Subjects Arf'iliation 
Unfavorable 
Discrepancy 16/24 63.6 8/24 44.6 
Zero 
Discrepanc,- 4/24 49.5 20/24 1.4 
Favorable 
Discrepancy 8/24 21.8 16/24 -1 • .5 
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(Siegel, 1956) was selected as being among the most powerful 
of the nonparametric tests for independent samples when 
ordinal data have been achieved. 
The results were virtually identical to the original 
findings where the effects of dissonance were uncontrolled. 
Ss in the unfavorable discrepancy conditions show signifi-
cantly greater desire for affiliation than Ss in either the 
favorable discrepancy or the zero discrepancy condition, 
while Ss in the favorable and zero discrepancy conditions 
did not differ significantly from one another (Table 12). 
The original hypothesis concerning the effects of unfavorable 
comparison continues to be unsupported. 
In order to ascertain whether the dissonance variable 
exerted any influence on desire for affiliation (as suggested 
by dissonance theory; Festinger, 1957), a comparison of dis" 
sonant and non-dissonant Ss was made within the favorable, 
zero, and unfavorable discrepancy conditions. Again, the 
Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was employed for the 
reasons previously presented. The results of these com-
parisons are given in Table 13. Consistent with expectations 
from dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), dissonant favorable 
discrepancy and dissonant zero discrepancy Ss show signifi-
cantly more desire for affiliation than their non-dissonant 
counterparts. The difference between the dissonant unfavor-
able discrepancy condition and the non-dissonant unfavorable 
discrepancy condition is in the expected direction, and 
approaches but fails to achieve statistical significance. 
58 
TABLE 12 
MAmi-WITBEY U ANALYSIS OF AFFILIATION SCORES FOR ALL 
COMPARISONS AMONG THE DISCREPANCY CONDITIONS 
(EFFECTS OF DISSONANCE REMOVED} 
Condition R u 
Unfavorable Discrepancy 8 144 
20 
Favorable Discrepancy 16 166 
Unfavorable Discrepancy 8 16.5 • .5 
Zero Discrepancy 20 190 • .5 
30 • .5 
Favorable Discrepancy 16 279.5 
143-.5 Zero Discrepancy 20 386.5 
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p 
.o1 
.o1 
n.s. 
TABLE 1.3 
MANN·WliiTBEY U ANALYSIS OF AFFILIATION SCORES OF DISSONANT 
AID NON-DISSONANT SUBJECTS IN EACH OF THE 
THREE DISCREPANCY CONDITIONS 
Conditions N R u 
Unfavorable Discrepancy 
With Dissonance 16 213.5 
p 
50.5 n.s. 
Unfavorable Discrepancy 
Without Dissonance 8 86.5 
Zero Discrepancy 
4 With Dissonance 81.5 8.5 .01 
Zero Discrepancy 
Without Dissonance 20 218.5 
Favorable Discrepancy 
8 With Dissonance 127 
30 .o5 
Favorable Discrepancy 
Without Dissonance 16 173 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Social comparison theory hypothesizes a need for self 
evaluation through comparison of experience with others when 
objective information is not available. The results of the 
present study clearly support this prediction. Fearful Ss 
given information regarding the intensity of their own and 
others' fear demonstrate significantly less desire for affili-
ation than similarly fearful Ss without this information. 
This finding is clearly consistent with Schacter's (1959) 
series of studies which were designed to reveal the arousal 
of the affiliation motive as a consequence of the wish to make 
social comparison of the fear emotion resulting from an 
ambiguous and novel stimulus. 
In general design, the present study more closely 
approximates the methodology of Gerard and Rabbie (1961). 
Fear was aroused and objective information made available to 
some and not to others. The results of the two experiments 
are generally consistent. 
In addition to offering further support for one of the 
basic tenets of Social Comparison theory, systematic observa-
tions were made of the possible effects of sex and general 
affiliative tendency. Ss were confined to those who were 
first born in their respective families. The distribution 
of scores on general affiliative tendency was shown to be no 
more than that expected by chance, thus eliminating this 
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source of variance as a possible explanation of the findings 
which previous studies had not done. 
In addition, the influence of sex does not have appre-
ciable effect on the fear-affiliation relationship either by 
itself or in interaction with other variables. This finding 
is not entirely in accord with prediction or with previous 
observations. Gerard and Rabbie (1961) found that first-born 
males showed significantly less affiliation than first-born 
females under the same fear-provoking condition of threatened 
electric shock. OUr own result showed no difference in desire 
for affiliation in any of the groups as a consequence of sex. 
Different measurement techniques and other methodological 
variations may have contributed to the difference between 
the present finding and that of Gerard and Rabbie. These 
methodological differences, such as the method of measuring 
affiliation, and the fact that both high and low fear levels 
as well as the different information treatments were 
collapsed in the Gerard and Rabbie study, produce a number 
of factors which might contribute to the differences in the 
studies. Further analyses of their data lead to statistically 
unstable results due to the limited cell sizes which result 
from any attempt to control the various influences. 
Our own sex comparison was based on equal numbers of 
male and female Ss who had either no information or the same 
information about the intensity of fear of self and others. 
They were exposed to identical fear arousing conditions, and 
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showed no difference either in the anount of rated fear or 
in their general level of affiliative tendency. The greater 
control over extraneous variables coupled with adequate 
sample size suggests that the. present data may more accurately 
reflect a lack of difference between the sexes in desire for 
affiliation as a consequence of fear arousal and/or desire 
for comparison under various information conditions. 
At the same time, this observed lack of sex difference 
in the unfavorable discrepancy group is not in accord with 
our prediction that males would show significantly less 
desire for affiliation than females due to the greater 
salience of the emotion of fear for men with the accompanying 
avoidance of unfavorable comparison. No ready explanation 
offers itself other than that the hypothesis is not correct. 
The result suggests that the arousal and control of fear may 
not be a more salient emotion for college men than for 
college women. 
Inspection of the post-expertmental questionnaire data 
(Appendix G) reveals that most men believe that women will 
mark the fear rating scale at a point much higher than them" 
selves, asserting that they will actually be more frightened 
than themselves. Most women, on the other hand, indicate 
that men will mark the fear scale at a point lower than them-
selves. While some women actually feel that men will be less 
apprehensive, many express the belief that men would actually 
be as afraid as women but would not admit it. In effect, the 
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two sexes tend to rate one anothers' fear with the same 
expectation which guided the experimental prediction. How-
ever, they do not, in fact, behave in accord with their ex-
pectations of each other. Each tends to check the fear 
scale at the same level as revealed by the lack of difference 
in their fear self-rating scale means. The occurrence of a 
significant sex difference in the analyses of scores from ~he 
Colortmetric Index of fear may be considered to cast some 
doubt on the hypothesis of fear between the sex groups. How-
ever, it is the present contention that this finding 
reflects a difference in male and female physiology with 
reference to perspiring under threat, rather than a difference 
in the amount of fear actually aroused. 
One may speculate as to whether this lack of difference 
in affiliation in the unfavorable discrepancy condition 
between the sexes would hold true in a non-college or less 
well educated population. Greater acceptability of fear as 
an appropriate and discussable emotion may be related to 
education and knowledge as well as the more introspective or 
self examining personality generally associated with people 
seeking higher learning. One might also question whether 
college-attending women are more masculine and aggressive in 
their attitudes. This question must await further experi-
mental data. 
The two hypotheses concerning the effects of leading Ss 
to believe that they are unfavorably discrepant in the 
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intensity of their fear reactions are not supported by the 
data. These are: 
A. The unfavorable discrepancy group (more afraid) will 
show less affiliation than the zero discrepancy 
group (as afraid). 
B. The unfavorable discrepancy group will show less 
affiliation than the favorable discrepancy group 
(less afraid). 
It will be recalled that the prediction concerning the un" 
favorable and zero discrepancy groups was based on two con-
siderations. The first was the discrepancy hypothesis from 
Social Comparison theory, which states that a person does not 
tend to evaluate his emotions with others too divergent from 
himself. The second consideration was the threat of arousal 
of comparison !ear as a consequence of affiliating with 
others who would be seen as superior in their expression and 
control of the culturally salient emotion of fear. 
The prediction concerning the comparison of the unfavor-
able and favorable discrepancy groups was made on the grounds 
that while discrepancy was constant for both, the favorable 
discrepancy Ss would not be confronted with fear of compari-
son and hence should show less need to avoid affiliation with 
others. In fact, there was some thought that the superior 
fear control of the favorable discrepancy group as indicated 
by the false norms (30-50) might lead to greater affiliation 
desire than that shown by the zero discrepancy group. This 
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possibility was thought attributable to the wish perhaps to 
display their superiority to their peers. In effect, dis-
crepancy and fear of comparison would work in concert in the 
unfavorable discrepancy group to reduce affiliation desire, 
while discrepancy and desire to display superiority would con-
ceivably work in opposition in their effect on affiliation 
desire in the favorable discrepancy group. Neither of these 
predictions was confirmed. In fact, both predicted compari-
sons were found to be significant in the opposite direction. 
There are several possible explanations: a) The 
various discrepancy conditions were not achieved, b) the dis-
crepancy hypothesis from Social 6anparison theory is in-
correct, and c) other unconsidered variables were operating. 
One may reasonably el~inate the adequacy of the discre-
pancy operations as the difficulty, since inspection of the 
questionnaire data indicates that all of the Ss verbalized 
their acceptance of the objective fear intensity information 
communicated to them. Also, the two control variables, fear 
intensity and general affiliative tendency, reveal no 
differences between information conditions. Some of the Ss 
verbalized conflict between their own self-assessment and 
the objective rating assigned them. Eltmination of these Ss 
from the comparisons yielded the same result in reduced pro-
portion. We shall return to this issue shortly. 
Was comparison fear aroused? Again, inspection of the 
questionnaire data (Appendix G) reveals that virtually all of 
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the Ss in the unfavorable discrepancy condition said that they 
did not like the idea of being rated as more afraid than 
others. This was not true of the Ss in the zero and favorable 
discrepancy groups. From this it may be inferred that some 
additional unpleasant tension was generated in the unfavorable 
discrepancy group. 
One may question whether the numerical value of dis-
crepancy communicated to Ss was sufficiently large to produce 
the expected psychological effect. The question is not 
directly answerable, and no previous data were available to 
serve as guides. However, the fact that some significant 
differences emerged, even though in an opposing direction, 
suggests that the communicated information had some impact on 
the s. Since the only apparent purpose of the communication 
was to create belief in discrepancy, it seems appropriate to 
assume that this was the effect produced. 
Since it is difficult to question the adequacy of the 
operations, a re-reading of Social Comparison theory is in 
order, focusing attention on the following formulations. 
Paraphrased, the theory states that any factor increasing 
the strength of drive to evaluate an emotion will lead to 
efforts to reduce discrepancy and pressure for uniformity 
concerning that emotion. Further, the discrepant individual 
will either change the expression of his emotion to meet the 
group norm, attempt to move the group norm closer to his own, 
or cease comparing. 
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These formulations suggest some of the limitations of 
the present study along with several lines of speculative 
inquiry. Social Comparison theory was primarily intended to 
explain the behavior of groups and individuals in groups. 
In the present experiment, no groups were ever formed. 
Group formation was only implied for the S. It may be that 
the actual experience of social comparison is necessary, 
even with possession of objective information, Whenever some 
factor such as threatto self esteem increases the pressure 
towards uniformity and reduction of discrepancy. Gerard and 
Rabbie (1961) make a similar observation in discussing their 
results when they observe, "when there is something at stake 
for the individual - - - he will tend to reduce uncertainty." 
In the present experiment, when the S was informed that he 
was unfavorably discrepant in his fear reaction, it may be 
that he sought social comparison more vigorously in an 
initial effort to reduce or comprehend the fear discrepancy 
before seeking isolation to avoid further unfavorable com-
parison. 
Perhaps in the comparison with others having undergone 
the same threat experience, he hoped to find some means of 
either bringing the group norm closer to his own, or else to 
obtain some further information from group members Which 
would help him to rationalize or make comprehensible his own 
discrepancy. For example, he might hope to find that the 
discrepant reference group had considerable familiarity with 
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electric shock and accordingly were less apprehensive. 
Failing this, following the group experience of comparison, 
he might then seek isolation to avoid further tension 
generated by the unfavorable comparison. The zero and 
favorable discrepancy groups did not experience this addi-
tional ~pelling force tewards evaluation and, therefore, 
showed less desire for affiliation and social comparison 
than either the unfavorable discrepancy or the no information 
groups. Unfortunately, since these possibilities had not 
been anticipated, no post-exper~ental inquiry bearing on 
this issue was included in the question session following 
the experiment. 
In summary, it is suggested that whenever some force is 
aroused which makes evaluation more urgent, increased desire 
for social comparisonwill be manifested--even with a group 
known to be reacting differently if it is the only one 
available. While the present design is far from adequate for 
testing these formulations, some tentative support does 
emerge from these data as well as from the data of previous 
studies. 
In the present study, when the Ss were separated 
according to the presence or absence of cognitive dissonance 
with regard to conflict between their self and objective fear 
ratings, a significant increase in affiliation was noted for 
both dissonant favorable discrepancy and dissonant zero 
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discrepancy Ss, compared with their non-dissonant counter-
parts. Thus, while a comparison of zero and favorable dis-
crepancy Ss showed no difference in affiliation desire, com-
parison of dissonant and non-dissonant S in these groups 
revealed significantly more affiliation tendency, suggesting 
that this cognitive conflict has made the need for evaluation 
more cogent than for Ss without this conflict. 
The argument is rendered somewhat ambiguous by the 
observation that the dissonant and non-dissonant unfavorable 
discrepancy Ss revealed no significant difference in affilia-
tion desire, although they did vary considerably in the 
expected direction. However, one must bear in mind that the 
non-dissonant unfavorable discrepancy group had both dis-
sonance and threatening discrepancy impelling increased 
desire for social comparison. Since the two forces operate 
in the same direction, and one has no way of evaluating the 
relative strength of dissonance and unfavorable discrepancy 
as affiliation motives, it may simply be that unfavorable 
comparison is the more salient, thereby tending to obscure 
the effect of dissonance in this canparison. 
The present contention is also consistent with some of 
Gerard and Rabbie's (1961) findings. Their study employed 
three information conditions: no information about fear 
intensity, objective information only about one's own fear 
intensity, and objective information about the intensity 
reaction of others as well as their own. In the latter case, 
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all Ss were led to believe that others were as afrais as 
themselves. They report that Ss having information only 
about their own fear reaction demonstrated greater affilia-
tion tendency than either of the other two conditions. In 
discussing this, they suggest that knowledge of absolute 
standing induced a greater desire for knowledge of relative 
standing. We would concur with this, and in addition note 
that very likely those Ss who possessed only information 
about their own fear intensity also experienced the effects 
of dissonance. That this is the case is suggested by the 
data showing that they had est~ted their fear level to be 
about 60, whereas they had been told it was 80. The dis-
sonance motive would have been less in the group possessing 
comparative information of relative standing, since all Ss 
with comparative standing information had been led to believe 
they were equally afraid at 80. They had the convenient 
rationalization that the self-objective fear rating disparity 
was the result of misinterpretation of the physiological fear 
scale in relation to their self assessment. Therefore, there 
was less need to affiliate to clarify this disparity in 
fear rating. 
Thusfar, some indirect support has been offered for the 
hypothesis that a force bringing about an increase in the 
evaluative need will induce greater affiliation for social 
comparison. It is further contended that once affiliation 
has occurred, discrepancy concerning some salient emotion 
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will bring about pressure to reduce discrepancy. While no 
information is available from the present study, the data 
from Wrightsman's (1959) experiment support this hypothesis. 
Fearful Ss permitted to affiliate with other Ss showed both 
a reduction and a homogenization of fear in that there was a 
reduction in the rated level of fear as well as reduced 
variation in self rated fear estimates. It is very tenta-
tively suggested that had the present unfavorable discrepancy 
S been allowed to affiliate, their efforts would have been 
directed in some measure towards reducing the self-other 
discrepancy. Failing this (using groups of experimental 
confederates), they might well have sought isolation from 
the group. 
With regard to the Sarnoff and Zimbardo (1961) findings 
of anxiety leading to isolation as contrasted to fear, the 
present results offer no refutation. One of the original 
foci of our attention was an attempt to demonstrate that 
rather than anxiety leading to isolation, it was the sense 
of discrepancy from his fellows with the accompanying com-
parison fear of being inappropriately different which 
dictated a reduced affiliation preference. In fact, unfavor-
able comparison led to heightened affiliation. The present 
design may have failed to demonstrate this comparison fear 
effect due to the stronger need to attempt to reduce dis-
crepancy through social comparison. In comparing the two 
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studies, two factors stand out Which make precise interpreta-
tion difficult. In Sarnoff and Zimbardo's experiment, the 
Ss sense of discrepancy came from an introspective judge-
ment about which he had apparently little question. In 
effect, the anxious S apparently believed unquestiongly that 
in his discomfort he was reacting quite differently (and 
inappropriately) from his peers. 
It may be that the difference in findings in the two 
experiments is related to the magnitude of the believed 
discrepancy and the conviction with whichit was held. In one 
of Schacter's (1959) experiments, it was found that high fear 
Ss did not show significantly more affiliation than low fe~ 
Ss when they were offered the opportunity to be with a group 
who had not been through the same fear-provoking experience. 
However, the high fear Ss did show significantly more 
affiliation than low fear Ss when offered an opportunity to 
be with others undergoing the electric shock experiment. 
One may argue that Schacter's Ss did not want to be with a 
group who presumably are reacting very differently from 
themselves since they had not undergone the fear-provoking 
experience. 
By the same token, it could be said that Sarnoff and 
Zimbardo's anxious Ss felt that they were reacting extremely 
differently from others to the degree of not even having the 
same experience, with consequent reduction in affiliation 
desire. In the present experiment, the S was told by an 
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external source that he was reacting differently from his 
peers. Whether the quantitative and qualitative amount of 
difference generated by the two experimental situations are 
comparable is impossible to determine. 
It must also be considered that discussing one's reaction 
to painful shock to the hand may be a far more socially 
acceptable topic of conversation than discussing the sensa-
tions and reactions aroused by sucking on infantile nursing 
equipment. To use an extreme example, one might inquire 
whether the unfavorable discrepancy Ss in the present experi-
ment would have desired affiliation and social comparison with 
the same strength had the threat of shock been to some 
aspect of sexual function, i.e., a less socially acceptable 
topic for discussion. In any event, the present data do not 
support a refutation of the Sarnoff and Zimbardo hypothesis 
concerning the lack of generality of Social Comparison 
theory across the emotions of anxiety and fear. 
While these initial attempts to make predictions about 
the effects of discrepancy are not confirmed, several likely 
hypotheses emerge with some supporting evidence. The force 
of cognitive dissonance was suggestively indicated to have a 
positive effect on the desire for social comparison. It was 
also suggested that the actual experience of group comparison 
may be necessary to confirm an objectively assigned discrep-
ancy from others when it is threatening to the individual. 
An individual will not choose to evaluate his emotional 
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experience by social comparison when objective information is 
available, if that information does not give rise to increased 
pressure to avoid discrepancy and achieve uniformity. When 
some force, such as threat to self-esteem or cognitive dis-
sonance, is aroused, then desire for evaluation is increased 
and social comparison, even with a discrepant group, seems 
to be preferable to no evaluation. Further experimentation 
might focus on any one of these suggestive avenues of 
exploration. 
Future research could control or manipulate cognitive 
dissonance by initially ascertaining the Ss' felt fear level 
on a rating scale and then making certain that the communi-
cated objective information coincides with it. Discrepancy 
could also be varied in either direction by communicating 
that most other people reveal some fixed percentage amount 
of discrepancy from the present Ss' rating. With both dis-
sonance and/or objective discrepancy varied, one could allow 
groups to form to answer the question whether Ss Who have 
been given unfavorable discrepancy information will cease 
comparing themselves with a discrepant reference group more 
rapidly than Ss in either a zero discrepant or favorably 
discrepant condition as predicted in this study. In a more 
elaborate design one might also profitably vary the size of 
the objective discrepancy to investigate the possible effects 
of this variable as suggested in the discussion of the 
Sarnoff and Z~bardo material. 
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CHAP'l'ER VI 
SUMMARY 
This study is a report of an investigation of some of 
the determinants of the desire for affiliation as a conse-
quence of the arousal of the emotion of fear. Predictions 
were derived from previous research related to; a) the effect 
upon affiliation of having or not having objective informa-
tion about the intensity of self and others• fear reactions 1 
and b) the awareness of reacting discrepantly 1 i.e. 1 with 
more or less fear intensity than peers in identical stress 
situations. 
According to Schacter•s elaboration of Festinger•s 
Social Comparison theory 1 an individual has a drive to evalu-
ate his emotions by comparison with others when objective 
means of doing so are unavailable. To support this conten-
tion he manipulated fear intensity and measured desire for 
affiliation, finding that atfiliative tendency was positively 
related to fear level 1 and that fearful Ss only wish to 
affiliate with similarly 1'earful Ss. He also observed, 
incidentally1 that the earlier the individual's birth position 
to his sibling hierarchy, the more he desired affiliation when 
fearful. 
Observing that Social Comparison theory predicts that 
people will not seek social comparison when objective criteria 
for evaluation are available, Gerard and Rabbie predicted and 
found support for the hypothesis that apprehensive Ss provided 
with objective information concerning the intensity of their 
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own and other's fear reactions would show less desire for 
affiliation than those Ss without such information. These 
and other findings were generally consistent with the expecta-
tion that the arousal of emotion led to increased desire to 
affiliate as a consequence of a need to evaluate that state 
by comparison with others. 
In opposition to belief in the generality of Social 
Comparison theory for emotions other than fear, Sarnoff and 
Zimbardo experimentally created states d fear and anxiety. 
In contrast to fear, anxiety was defined within the psycho-
analytic framework as an emotional state resembling fear, but 
induced without discernible threat of pain. Its arousal 
coincided with a threatened breakdown of repressive defenses. 
Anxiety was stimulated by leading Ss to anticipate sucking on 
infant nursing equipment. Sarnoff and Zimbardo confirmed 
that anxious Ss would not show an increase in desire for 
affiliation, since anxious Ss would seek isolation ~n order 
to regain control and to avoid revealing the inappropriateness 
of their reactions to others. Fear, on the other hand, had 
the opposite result. These findings raised questions about 
the generality of Comparison theory beyond the specific 
emotion of fear. 
In an effort to understand these conflicting findings, it 
was observed that hypothesis III from Social Comparison 
theory states that a person does not tend to evaluate his 
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emotions with others reacting differently from himself. This 
suggested the possibility that Sarnoff and Zimbardo's anxious 
Ss may have shown reduced affiliation in the implicit belief 
that others were not experiencing the same intensity of 
emotion as themselves. It will be recalled that Schacter 
found that fearful Ss wanted to affiliate only with other 
fearful Ss. 
It was further proposed that salient features of the 
emotion of fear compel some consideration of the direction of 
a discrepancy from others (more, less fearful than others) as 
well as the magnitude or degree of discrepancy. The acknow-
ledgement of fear often evokes social disappooval from peers. 
Culturally conditioned social-sexual role learning makes fear 
more cogent for males than for females. Knowledge of being 
more apprehensive than peers in a fear-provoking situation 
may lead to reduced desire for affiliation as a consequence of 
unfavorable comparison. In view of the greater salience of 
fear for males, greater reduction in desire for affiliation 
was expected to occur in males than females under these con-
ditions. By contrast, an individual who believed himself to 
be less afraid than his peers, while discrepant from them, 
would not be thus motivated to avoid social comparison to the 
same degree. 
The forgoing considerations led to the assumption that 
sex and direction of discrepancy of reaction from others were 
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determinants of the desire for affiliation. 
A. Hypothese•· 
On the basis of these considerations, the following 
predictions were derived: 
1. Under conditions of zero discrepancy (as afraid as 
others), desire for affiliation will be reduced as 
compared with conditions of no information. 
2. Under conditions of unfavorable discrepancy (more 
afraid than others), desire for affiliation will be 
reduced as compared with Ss in the zero discrepancy 
conditions {as afraid). 
3. Under conditions of unfavorable discrepancy, desire 
for affiliation will be reduced as compared with 
conditions of favorable discrepancy (less afraid). 
4. Under conditions of unfavorable discrepancy, men will 
exhibit less desire for affiliation than women. 
B. Method of Procedure 
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Forty-eight males and 4e females aged 17 to 23 were drawn 
from a pool of volunteer college students and randomly assigned 
to four experimental conditions: favorable diserepancy, zero 
discrepancy, unfavorable discrepancy, and no information. All 
Ss believed they were volunteering for a psychophysiological 
study. Only first-born Ss were selected. Fear was aroused 
by threat of painful electric shock under the pretext of a 
psychophysiological study. Depending on the treatment 
conditions to which he was assigned, the S was led to 
believe that he was ~qually, more, or less afraid than 
his peers. A fourth group was given no fear intensity 
information. The S was then told that a delay would be 
necessary and given the choice of waiting alone with other 
Ss involved in the experiment. A rating scale estimate of the 
strength of his preference to wait either alone or together 
was obtained from each S. All Sa were then told the true 
purpose of the experiment, and answered a series of questions 
concerning their acceptance of the various experimental 
deceptions. 
Two indices of actual fear intensity were obtained prior 
to the discrepancy induction to demonstrate that groups did 
not differ on this variable. The Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule was administered to examine possible dif'ferences in 
general affiliative tendency. 
c. Results and Conclusions 
Significant mean differences in desire for affiliation 
were obtained between the zero discrepancy and no information 
groups supporting the first hypothesis. It was concluded that 
possession of objective non-threatening normative information 
(one is equal in fear to others) leads to a reduced need to 
affiliate. 
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The two hypotheses involving comparisons of the uni'avor-
able discrepancy group with the zero and favorable discrepancy 
groups were not supported. Significant differences were 
obtained in the direction opposite to that which was pre-
dicted with respect to both hypothese. These findings were 
discussed in relation to the influence of cognitive conflict 
the absence of actual group formations, and other possibly 
relevant factors. 
No sex differences were observed in the various experi-
mental conditions in this study, suggesting that the arousal 
of fear is not markedly more salient for college men than 
college women. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE APPREHENSION INTENSITY RATING SCALE 
APPREHENSION INTENSITY RATING SCALE Dr. Hunt 
Physiological Sensitivity - Exp. 3 
N~-----------------------
I I I I I I I I I 
Mildly Moderately Very Extremely Not at All 
Uneasy Uneasy Uneasy Uneasy Uneasy 
Please make a check anywhere along the line o£ the scale to indicate approximately 
how uneasy you £eel about the coming series ~£ electric shocks. The indicated 
points are only there to serve as guides for you. You may check the line at any 
point. 
00 
~ 
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APPENDIX B 
THE AFFILIATION AND ISOLATION PREFERENCE SCALES 
DECISION MAKING DATA SCAlE c. G. Stone 
Social Psychology 
No Preference 
for waiting alone 
L ----~~~------------~------------~ Moderate Preference Strong Preference 
for waiting alone for waiting alone 
Please make a check anywhere along the line of the scale to indicate the approximate 
strength of your wish to wait alone. 
DECISION MAKING DATA SCALE c. G. Stone 
Social Psychology 
I I I I I 
No Preference Moderate Preference Strong Preference 
for waiting with for waiting with for waiting with 
other subjects other subjects other subjects 
Please make a check anywhere along the line of the scale to indicate the approximate 
strength of your wish to wait with other subjects. 
00 
0\ 
APPENDIX C 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLORIM:E:l'REC INDEX 
OF PALMAR SWEA!'ING 
Two of the s•s fingers were coated with a solution 
of anhydrous :ferric chloride and permitted to dey. Follow• 
ing this, the S was required to press these treated :fingers 
to some acetone-treated paper :for a period of three minutes 
with a constant pressure of 16 ounces. The latter was sel:f 
controlled by placing the paper atop a small spring-act!" 
vated postage scale and telling the S to press on the paper 
until the meter read 16 ounces. The result was two finger• 
prints whose density varied positively with the amount of 
perspiration on the s•s :fingers. The arithmetic value of 
these prints was obtained by means o:f a densitometer whose 
construction and use was virtually identical to that used 
by Mowrer (1953). 
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APPENDIX D 
IN THE EDWARDS PERSONAL PBEFEREBCE SCHEDULE FOLLOWING, ALL 
ITEMS CmCLED PERTAIN TO THE MEASUREMENT OF GENERAL 
AFF ILIATIOll TENDENCY 
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Edwards Personal Preference Schedule 
Allen L. Edwards, University of Washington 
DIRECTIONS 
This schedule consists of a number of pairs of statements about things that you may or may not 
like; about ways in which you may or may not feel. Look at the example below. 
A I like to talk about myself to others. 
B I like to work toward some goal that I have set for myself. 
Which of these two statements is more characteristic of what you like? If you like "talking about 
yourself to others" more than you like "working toward some goal that you have set for yourself," then 
you should choose A over B. If you like "working toward some goal that you have set for yourself" more 
than you like "talking about yourself to others," then you should choose B over A. 
You may like both A and B. In this case, you would have to choose between the two and you should 
choose the one that you like better. If you dislike both A and B, then you should choose the one that you 
dislike less. 
Some of the pairs of statements in the schedule have to do with your likes, such as A and B above. 
Other pairs of statements have to do with how you feel. Look at the example below. 
A I feel depressed when I fail at something. 
B I feel nervous when giving a talk before a group. 
Which of these two statements is more characteristic of how you feel? If "being depressed when you 
fail at something" is more characteristic of you than "being nervous when giving a talk before a group," 
then you should choose A over B. If B is more characteristic of you than A, then you should choose B 
over A. 
If both statements describe how you feel, then you should choose the one which you think is more 
characteristic. If neither statement accurately describes how you feel, then you should choose the one 
which you consider to be less inaccurate. 
Your choice, in each instance, should be in terms of what you like· and how you feel at the present 
time, and not in terms of what you think you should like or how you think you should feel. This is 
not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. Your choices should be a description of your own per-
sonal likes and feelings. Make a choice for every pair of statements; do not skip any. 
The pairs of statements on the following pages are similar to the examples given above. Read each 
pair of statements and pick out the one statement that better describes what you like or how you feel. 
Make no marks in the booklet. On the separate answer sheet are numbers corresponding to the numbers 
of the pairs of statements. Check to be sure you are marking for the same item number as the item you 
are reading in the booklet. 
If your answer sheet is printed If your answer sheet is printed 
in BLACK ink: in BLUE ink: 
For each numbered item draw a circle around 
the A or B to indicate the statement you 
have chosen. 
For each numbered item fill in the space 
under A or B as shown in the Directions 
on the answer sheet. 
Do not turn this page until the examiner tells you to start. 
Printed in U.S.A. 
Copyright in Great Britain 
Copyright 1953. All rights reserved. 
The Psychol~gical Corporation 
New '! ork, New York 56-183 TB 
A I like to say things that are regarded as witty and 
clever by other people. 
B I like to put myself in someone else's place and to 
imagine how I would feel in the same situation. 
A I like to feel free to do what I want to do. 
B I like to observe how another individual feels m a 
given situation. 
A I like to accomplish tasks that others recognize as re-
quiring skill and effort. 
B I like my friends to encourage me when I meet with 
failure. 
A When planning something, I like to get suggestions 
from other people whose opinions I respect. 
B I like my friends to treat me kindly. 
A I like to have my life so arranged that it runs smoothly 
and without much change in my plans. 
B I like my friends to feel sorry for me when I am sick. 
A I like to be the center of attention in a group. 
B I like my friends to make a fuss over me when I am 
hurt or sick. 
A I like to avoid situations where I am expected to do 
things in a conventional way. 
B I like my friends to sympathize with me and to cheer 
me up when I am depressed. 
A I would like to write a great novel or play. 
B When serving on a committee, I like to be appointed 
or elected chairman. 
A When I am in a group, I like to accept the leadership 
of someone else in deciding what the group is going 
to do. 
B I like to supervise and to direct the actions of other 
people whenever I can. 
A I like to keep my letters, bills, and other papers neatly 
arranged and filed according to some system. 
B I like to be one of the leaders in the organizations and 
groups to which I belong. 
A I like to ask questions which I know no one will be 
able to answer. 
B I like to tell other people how to do their jobs. 
A I like to avoid responsibilities and obligations. 
B I like to be called upon to settle arguments and dis-
putes between others. 
A I would like to be a recognized authority in some job, 
profession, or field of specialization. 
B I feel guilty whenever I have done something I know 
is wrong. 
A I like to read about the lives of great men. 
B I feel that I should confess the things that I have done 
that I regard as wrong. 
A I like to plan and organize the details of any work 
that I have to undertake. 
B When things go wrong for me, I feel that I am more 
to blame than anyone else. 
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49 A I like to use words which other people often do not 
know the meaning of. 
B I feel that I am inferior to others in most respects. 
50 A I like to criticize people who are in a position of au-
thority. 
B I feel timid in the presence of other people I regard 
as my superiors. 
51 A I like to do my very best in whatever I undertake. 
B I like to help other people who are less fortunate than 
I am. 
52 A I like to find out what great men have thought about 
various problems in which I am interested. 
B I like to be generous with my friends. 
53 A I like to make a plan before starting in to do some-
thing difficult. 
B I like to do small favors for my friends. 
54 A I like to tell other people about adventures and strange 
things that have happened to me. 
B I like my friends to confide in me and to tell me their 
troubles. 
55 A I like to say what I think about things. 
B I like to forgive my friends who may sometimes 
hurt me. 
56 A I like to be able to do things better than other people 
can. 
B I like to eat in new and strange restaurants. 
57 A I like to conform to custom and to avoid doing things 
that people I respect might consider unconventional. 
B I like to participate in new fads and fashions. 
58 A I like to have my work organized and planned before 
beginning it. 
B I like to travel and to see the country. 
59 A I like people to notice and to comment upon my ap-
pearance when I am out in public. 
B I like to move about the country and to live in differ-
ent places. 
60 A I like to be independent of others in deciding what I 
want to do. 
B I like to do new and different things. 
61 A I like to be able to say that I have done a difficult job 
well. 
B I like to work hard at any job I undertake. 
62 A I like to tell my superiors that they have done a good 
job on something, when I think they have. 
B I like to complete a single job or task at a time before 
taking on others. 
63 A If I have to take a trip, I like to have things planned 
in advance. 
B I like to keep working at a puzzle or problem until 
it is solved. 
64 A sometimes like to do things just to see what effect 
it will have on others. 
B I like to stick at a job or problem even when it may 
seem as if I am not getting anywhere with it. 
97 A I like to study and to analyze the behavior of others. 
B I like to do things that other people regard as uncon-
ventional. 
98 A I like my friends to feel sorry for me when I am sick. 
B I like to avoid situations where I am expected to do 
things in a conventional way. 
99 A I like to supervise and to direct the actions of other 
people whenever I can. 
B I like to do things in my own way without regard to 
what others may think. 
00 A I feel that I am inferior to others in most respects. 
B I like to avoid responsibilities and obligations. 
01 A I like to be successful in things undertaken. 
B I like to form new friendships. 
02 A I like to analyze my own motives and feelings. 
B I like to make as many friends as I can. 
03 A I like my friends to help me when I am in trouble. 
B I like to do things for my friends. 
04 A I like to argue for my point of view when it is at-
tacked by others. 
B I like to write letters to my friends. 
05 A I feel guilty whenever I have done something I know 
is wrong. 
B I like to have strong attachments with my friends. 
06 A I like to share things with my friends. 
B I like to analyze my own motives and feelings. 
07 A I like to accept the leadership of people I admire. 
B I like to understand how my friends feel about vari-
ous problems they have to face. 
08 A I like my friends to do many small favors for me 
cheerfully. 
B I like to judge people by why they do something-
not by what they actually do. 
09 A When with a group of people, I like to make the 
decisions about what we are going to do. 
B I like to predict how my friends will act in various 
situations. 
10 A I feel better when I give in and avoid a fight, than 
I would if I tried to have my own way. 
B I like to analyze the feelings and motives of others. 
11 A I like to form new friendships. 
B I like my friends to help me when I am in trouble. 
12 A I like to judge people by why they do something-
not by what they actually do. 
B I like my friends to show a great deal of affection 
toward me. 
13 A I like to have my life so arranged that it runs 
smoothly and without much change in my plans. 
B I like my friends to feel sorry for me when I am sick. 
14 A I like to be called upon to settle arguments and dis-
putes between others. 
B I like my friends to do many small favors for me 
cheerfully. 
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115 A I feel that I should confess the things that I have 
done that I regard as wrong. 
B I like my friends to sympathize with me and to cheer 
me up when I am depressed. 
i 116 A I like to do things with my friends rather than by 
myself. 
B I like to argue for my point of view when it is at-
tacked by others. 
11 7 A like to think about the personalities of my friends 
and to try to figure out what makes them as 
they are. 
B I like to be able to persuade and influence others to 
do what I want to do. 
118 A I like my friends to sympathize with me and to cheer 
me up when I am depressed. 
B When with a group of people, I like to make the 
decisions about what we are going to do. 
119 A I like to ask questions which I know no one will be 
able to answer. 
B I like to tell other people how to do their jobs. 
120 A I feel timid in the presence of other people I regard 
as my superiors. 
B I like to supervise and to direct the actions of other 
people whenever I can. 
•, 121 A I like to participate in groups in which the members 
have warm and friendly feelings toward one another. 
B I feel guilty whenever I have done something I know 
is wrong. 
122 A I like to analyze the feelings and motives of others. 
B I feel depressed by my own inability to handle vari-
ous situations. 
123 A I like my friends to feel sorry for me when I am sick. 
B I feel better when I give in and avoid a fight, than 
I would if I tried to have my own way. 
124 A I like to be able to persuade and influence others to 
do what I want. 
B I feel depressed by my own inability to handle vari-
ous situations. 
125 A I like to criticize people who are in a position of 
authority. 
B I feel timid i~ the presence of other people I regard 
as my supenors. 
I like to participate in groups in which the members 
have warm and friendly feelings toward one another. 
B I like to help my friends when they are in trouble. 
127 A I like to analyze my own motives and feelings. 
B I like to sympathize with my friends when they are 
hurt or sick. 
128 A I like my friends to help me when I am in trouble. 
B I like to treat other people with kindness and sym-
pathy. 
129 A I like to be one of the leaders in the organizations 
and groups to which I belong. 
B I like to sympathize with my friends when they are 
hurt or sick. 
i2 A I like to meet new people. 
B Any written work that I do I like to have precise, 
neat, and well organized. 
i3 A I like to finish any job or task that I begin. 
B I like to keep my things neat and orderly on my desk 
or workspace. 
i4 A I like to be regarded as physically attractive by those 
of the opposite sex. 
B I like to plan and organize the details of any work 
that I have to undertake. 
i5 A I like to tell other people what I think of them. 
B I like to have my meals organized and a definite 
time set aside for eating. 
i6 A like to show a great deal of affection toward my 
friends. 
B I like to say things that are regarded as witty and 
clever by other people. 
,7 A I like to try new and different jobs-rather than to 
continue doing the same old things. 
B I sometimes like to do things just to see what effect 
it will have on others. 
18 A I like to stick at a job or problem even when it may 
seem as if I am not getting anywhere with it. 
B I like people to notice and to comment upon my ap-
pearance when I am out in public. 
,9 A I like to read books and plays in which sex plays a 
major part. 
B I like to be the center of attention in a group. 
0 A I feel like blaming others when things go wrong 
for me. 
B I like to ask questions which I know no one will 
be able to answer. 
1 A I like to sympathize with my friends when they are 
hurt or sick. 
B I like to say what I think about things. 
2 A I like to eat in new and strange restaurants. 
B I like to do things that other people regard as un-
conventional. 
3 A I like to complete a single job or task at a time be-
fore taking on others. 
B I like to feel free to do what I want to do. 
4 A I like to participate in discussions about sex and sex-
ual activities. 
B I like to do things in my own way without regard 
to what others may think. 
5 A I get so angry that I feel like throwing and break-
ing things. 
B I like to avoid responsibilities and obligations. 
6 A I like to help my friends when they are in trouble. 
B I like to be loyal to my friends. 
7 A I like to do new and different things. 
B I like to form new friendships. 
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178 A When I have some assignment to do, I like to start 
in and keep working on it until it is completed. 
B I like to participate in groups in which the members 
have warm and friendly feelings toward one another. 
179 A I like to go out with attractive persons of the op-
posite sex. 
B I like to make as many friends as I can. 
180 A I li~e to attack points of view that are contrary to 
mme. 
B I like to write letters to my friends. 
181 A I like to be generous with my friends. 
B I like to observe how another individual feels in a 
given situation. 
182 A I like to eat in new and strange restaurants. 
B I like to put myself in someone else's place and to 
imagine how I would feel in the same situation. 
183 A I like to stay up late working in order to get a job 
done. 
B I like to understand how my friends feel about vari-
ous problems they have to face. 
184 A I like to become sexually excited. 
B I like to study and to analyze the behavior of others. 
185 A I feel like making fun of people who do things that 
I regard as stupid. 
B I like to predict how my friends will act in various 
situations. 
186 A I like to forgive my friends who may sometimes 
hurt me. 
B I like my friends to encourage me when I meet with 
failure. 
187 A I like to experiment and to try new things. 
B I like my friends to be sympathetic and understand-
ing when I have problems. 
188 A I like to keep working at a puzzle or problem until 
it is solved. 
B I like my friends to treat me kindly. 
189 A I like to be regarded as physically attractive by those 
of the opposite sex. 
B I like my friends to show a great deal of affection 
toward me. 
190 A I feel like criticizing someone publicly if he de-
serves it. 
B I like my friends to make a fuss over me when I am 
hurt or sick. 
191 A I like to show a great deal of affection toward my 
friends. 
B I like to be regarded by others as a leader. 
192 A I like to try new and different jobs-rather than to 
continue doing the same old things. 
B When serving on a committee, I like to be appointed 
or elected chairman. 
193 A I like to finish any job or task that I begin. 
B I like to be able to persuade and influence others to 
do what I want. 
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APPENDIX E 
SCORES ON RATED FEAR, COLORIMETRIC FEAR, GENERAL. AFFILIATIVE 
TENDENCY AND EXPERIMENTAL AFFILIATION :DN THE UNB'A VORABLE 
DISCREPANCY GROUP FOR EACH MALE AND FEMALE SUBJECT 
RATED COLORIMETRIC GENERAL EXPERIMENTAL 
FEAR FEAR AFFILIATION AFFILIATION 
M 1 50 15 16 99 
M 2 37 23 79 80 
M 3 12 29 72 50 
M4 48 28 28 44 
M 5 44 29 21 73 
M 6 12 38 96 75 
M 7 25 28 36 74 
M 8 25 24 3 50 
M 9 15 17 7 40 
M 10 75 25 4 100 
M 11 25 25 ~~ 50 M 12 37 26 50 
F 1 30 36 32 48 
F 2 37 26 1 75 
F 3 62 39 4 55 
F 4 95 28 77 54 
F 5 50 37 24 62 
F 6 12 36 32 100 
F 7 27 29 58 50 
F 8 50 35 77 37 
F 9 12 37 77 37 
F 10 59 35 JE 52 
F 11 75 15 94 50 
F 12 25 27 2 -31 
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SCORES ON RATED FEAR, COLORIMETRIC FEAR, GENERAL AFFILIATIVE 
TENDENCY AND EXPERIMENTAL AFFILIATION IN THE ZERO DISCREPANCY 
GROUP FOR EACH MALE AND FEMALE SUBJECT 
RATED COLORIMETRIC GENERAL EXPERIMENTAL 
FEAR FEAR AFFILIATION AFFILIATION 
M 13 25 22 79 -24 
M 14 33 25 64 46 
M 15 48 19 36 -49 
M 16 50 15 2 75 
M 17 62 31 72 50 
M 18 62 28 21 48 
M 19 32 35 79 8 
M 20 62 25 11 50 
M 21 37 27 16 -25 
M 22 27 28 21 -36 
M 23 50 23 16 1 
M 24 37 14 64 49 
F 1~ ~~ 30 7 -67 F 1 31 12 37 
F 15 33 35 17 43 
F 16 25 23 41 50 
F 17 37 30 50 50 
F 18 26 22 32 -52 
F 19 54 21 90 47 
F 20 25 31 84 -50 
F 21 2 30 32 -98 
F 22 57 34 50 -24 
F 23 62 35 58 48 
F 24 47 33 77 48 
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SCORES ON RATED FEAR, COLORIMETRIC FEAR, GENERAL AFFILIATIVE 
TENDENCY AND EXPERIMENTAL AFFILIATION IN THE FAVORABLE 
DISCREPANCY GROUP FOR EACH MALE AND FEMALR:·SUBJECT 
RATED COLORIMETRIC GENERAL EXPERIMENTAL 
FEAR FEAR AFFILIATION AFFILIATION 
M 25 12 38 36 -62 
M 26 34 33 36 -69 
M 27 25 22 72 44 
M 28 37 15 36 50 
M 29 13 12 16 -25 
M 30 25 32 28 -25 
M 31 69 37 64 37 
M 32 71 37 11 25 
M 33 25 19 ~~ 1 M 34 46 35 -31 
M 35 70 28 45 -75 
M 36 50 27 28 40 
F 25 14 34 17 ~g F 26 37 37 32 
F 27 37 36 32 25 
F 28 19 31 58 37 
F 29 65 29 68 55 
F 30 30 37 68 44 
F 31 57 35 58 -100 
F 32 50 35 50 50 
F 33 34 30 7 31 
F 34 50 14 17 25 
F 35 29 38 2 -50 
F 36 32 38 94 45 
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SCORES ON RATED FEAR, COLORIMETRIC FEAR, GENERAL AFF'ILIATIVE 
TENDE~CY AND EXPERIMENTAL AFFILIATION IN THE NO INFORMATION 
GROUP FOR EACH MALE AND FEMALE SUBJECT 
RATED COLORIMETRIC GENERAL EXPERIMENTAL 
FEAR FEAR AFFILIATION AFFILIATION 
M 37 7 29 7 37 
M 38 27 32 45 41 
M 39 39 26 64 50 
M 40 37 14 
5tt 
57 
M 41 21 37 45 M42 25 36 96 65 
=~ 25 2o 54 50 29 10 64 61 M 45 75 18 45 50 
M 46 25 26 16 24 
M 47 36 29 89 50 
M 48 25 20 72 49 
F 37 62 6 17 52 
F 38 37 38 96 50 
F 49 26 14 41 62 F 0 26 30 41 -25 
F 41 50 39 50 50 F42 21 37 17 50 ~frl 50 14 4 54 52 17 1 33 
F 45 59 21 7 83 
F 46 63 33 12 54 
F 47 67 35 68 62 
F 48 57 22 7 52 
1. 
2. 
6. 
8. 
9. 
APPENDIX F 
POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
When the experiment was underway, did you believe that 
you would be shocked? (If not, why?) 
How apprehensive do you think most fellows (girls) might 
feel about the prospect o·f being shocked as I described 
in this experiment? It may be more, less, or the same 
as you checked. Would you please put a mark on the line 
of the scale where you think most other:. fellows (girls) 
would put it. 
Why do you think most fellows (girls) would have checked 
it there? i.e. (more, less, as) apprehensive than (as) 
yourself. 
On looking back, what did you think about when I asked 
you if you wanted to wait with others or alone? 
Can you recall any other reasons you might have had for 
choosing to wait together (alone)? 
Were you interested in comparing the way you seemed to 
be feeling in the experiment with the way others seemed 
to be feeling? 
Did you accept as a fact the (high, low average) fear 
level that the apparatus indicated you had during the 
experiment? 
Did it agree with the level of' fear you thought you were 
experiencing inside? 
Did it make you uncomfortable to think you were (more, 
less, as) afraid as most people? 
10. Did you accept the information as a fact? 
11. Did you get any idea of what the experiment was really 
about before I explained it to you? 
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APPENDIX 6 
SUMMARY OF POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 ARE EXPRESSED 
IN PROPORTION OF SUBJECTS RESPONDING AFFIRMATIVEL~ TO THE 
QUESTIONS IN EACH EXPERIMENT4L CONDITION 
UNFAVORABLE ZERO FAVORABLE NO 
DISCREPANCY DISCREPANCY DISCREPANCY INFORMATION 
1 24/24 24/24 24/24 24/24 
6 21/24 12/24 12/24 20/24 
7 24/24 24/24 24/24 
8 9/24 20/24 16/24 
9 20/24 2/24 2/24 
10 24/24 24/24 24/24 
11 0/24 0/24 0/24 0/24 
RESPONSES TO QUESTION 2 ARE EXPRESSED IN NUMBER OF SUBJECTS 
IN EACH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION INDICATING THEIR EXPECTATION 
OF BEING MORE, LESS, OR EQUALLY FEARFUL AS OTHERS 
OTHERS MORE OTHERS AS OTHERS LESS TOTAL 
FEARFUL FEARFUL FEARFUL 
UNFAVORABLE 
DISCREPANCY 15 4 5 24 
ZERO 
DISCREPANCY 14 8 2 24 
FAVORABLE 
DISCREPANCY 17 3 4 24 
NO 
INFORMATION 17 4 3 2!± 
TOTAL 63 19 14 96 
RESPONSES TO QUESTION 2a 
0~ 14 Males asked, 12 indicated their belief that females 
would have expressed more fear than males on the rating 
scale. 
Of 34 Females asked, 25 indicated their belief that females 
would have expressed more fear than males on the rating 
scale. 
RESPONSES TO QUESTION 3 
The two reasons most frequently given by subjects rating 
themselves less fearful than their peers, in order of 
occurence: 
1. Greater ~amiliarity with electricity. 
2. More self control than friends. 
The two reasons most frequently given by subjects rating 
themselves as more fearful than their peers, in order of 
occurenoe: 
1. Being generally more anxious than others. 
2. Being expecially frightened of electricity. 
The reason given by subjects rating themselves as fearful 
as others. 
1. I am like most other people. 
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS 4 AND 5 
Following is a list of reasons spontaneously given for 
preference for affiliation. They are listed in descending 
order of frequency o~ occurence: 
a. I wanted to compare my reactions with theirs. 
b. I like people and enjoy talking to them. 
c. I just didn't feel tike being alone. 
d. I felt it would make me feel less fearful if I was with 
someone. 
e. I like to meet new people and make new friends. 
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Following is a list or reasons spontaneously given for 
preference of being alone. They are listed in descending 
order of frequency of occurence: 
a. I thought I would use the time to do some homework. 
b. I just didn't feel like talking to anyone then. 
c. I felt like relaxing and reading rather than talking. 
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This study reports an investigation of some determinants 
of the desire for affiliation following fear arousal. Pre-
dictions were derived related to; a) the effect upon affili-
ation of having information about the fear intensity of self 
and others, and b) the awareness of reacting discrepantly, 
i.e., with more or less fear intensity than peers in 
identical stress situations. 
According to Schacter's elaboration of Festinger's 
Social Comparison theory, an individual wishes to evaluate 
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his emotions by comparison with others when objective means 
of doing so are unavailable. Manipulating fear intensity, 
Schacter found that affiliative tendency was positively 
related to fear level, and that fearful Ss wish to affiliate 
only with similarly fearful Ss. Gerard and Rabbie found that 
apprehensive Ss provided with information concerning the 
intensity of their own and others' fear reactions demonstrated 
less desire for affiliation than Ss without such information. 
Questioning the generality of Social Comparison theory 
for emotions other than fear, Sarnoff and Zimbardo induced 
two emotions: fear and anxiety. Anxiety was defined as an 
emotional state resembling fear, but induced without threat 
of pain. Reasoning that anxious Ss would seek isolation to 
regain control of repressive defenses, they showed that 
anxious Ss decreased in desire for affiliation compared with 
fearful Ss. 
To understand these conflicting findings, it was 
observed that hypothesis III from Social Comparison theory 
states that a person does not tend to evaluate his emotions 
with others reacting differently from himself. This 
suggested the possibility that Sarnoff and Ztmbardo's anxious 
Ss may have shown reduced affiliation in the belief that 
others were not experiencing the same intensity of emotion 
as themselves. 
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It was further proposed that salient features of the 
emotion of fear compel consideration of the direction of 
discrepancy (more, less fearful than others). The acknow-
ledgement of fear often evokes social disapproval from peers. 
Awareness of greater apprehension than peers in a fear-provoking 
situation may lead to reduced desire for affiliation due to 
fear of unfavorable comparison. By contrast, an individual 
believing himself to be less afraid than peers, while still 
discrepant, would not be as strongly motivated to avoid 
affiliation. 
From these considerations, the following predictions 
were derived. 
1. Under conditions of zero discrepancy (as afraid as 
others), desire far affiliation will be reduced as 
compared with conditions of no information. 
2. Under conditions of unfavorable discrepancy (more 
afraid than others), desire for affiliation will 
be reduced as compared with conditions of zero dis-
crepancy or unfavorable discrepancy (less afraid). 
Male and female volunteer college students were randomly 
assigned to four experimental conditions: favorable discre• 
pancy, zero discrepancy, unfavorable discrepancy, and no'; 
information. Fear was aroused by threat of painful electric 
shock under the pretext of a psychophysiological study. 
Depending on the treatment condition, the S was led to believe 
that he was more, equally, or less afraid than his peers. A 
fourth group was given no fear intensity information. The S 
was then told that a delay would be necessary and he was 
given the choice of waiting alone or with other Ss involved 
in the experiment. A rating scale est~ate of the strength 
of preference was obtained from each s. 
The results supported the first prediction. It was 
concluded that possession of objective non-threatening infor• 
mation (one is equal in fear to others) leads to a reduction 
in desire for affiliation. 
The second hypothesis was not supported in either aspect. 
Significant differences were obtained in the direction 
opposite to that predicted. No sex differences in affiliative 
tendency were found. These findings were discussed in 
relation to the influence of cognitive conflict and the 
absence of actual group formation. 
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